Commonwealth v. Zrncic
131 A.3d 1008
Pa. Super. Ct.2016Background
- Appellant Michael Zrncic (then ~31) pled guilty in 2009 to aggravated indecent assault for sexual contact with a 15‑year‑old student; plea included a five‑year mandatory minimum and an order that restitution amount be set at a later hearing.
- The Commonwealth moved to modify sentence to specify restitution; the trial court entered a post‑sentence order setting restitution (May 12, 2009) without a hearing and with a ten‑day notice to request a hearing; Zrncic did not seek one or appeal then.
- Years later, after garnishment attempts, Zrncic litigated the restitution order through pro se motions and PCRA filings; this Court (Jan. 29, 2015) held the original procedure was improper and remanded for a new sentencing hearing limited to restitution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106.
- The trial court conducted the remand hearing (Mar. 30, 2015), denied Zrncic’s request for appointed counsel, and imposed restitution split between the Victims Compensation Assistance Program and the victim.
- On appeal, the Superior Court concluded Zrncic was entitled to counsel at the resentencing (a critical stage), vacated the restitution portion of the sentence, and remanded for a new restitution‑limited sentencing where Zrncic may have counsel or proceed pro se.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Zrncic's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether §1106 allows post‑sentence amendment of restitution where amount was left for later determination | Post‑sentence modification was proper and the trial court could set restitution after sentencing | §1106 does not permit amending restitution post‑sentence when amount not set at sentencing | Previously resolved by this Court on remand; law‑of‑the‑case applies — not redecided here |
| 2. Whether the trial court violated this Court’s remand order by its approach | Trial court complied with remand by holding a restitution hearing | Trial court’s procedure on remand violated §1106 and this Court’s mandate | Law‑of‑the‑case prevents re‑litigating points already decided in Jan. 29, 2015 memorandum |
| 3. Whether restitution was legally authorized (no direct property damage or personal injury) | Restitution here was supported by claimed replacement costs and counseling expenses | No direct property or personal injury as required by §1106 — restitution improper | Not decided on merits; outcome would follow new sentencing hearing after counsel issue resolved |
| 4. Whether denial of appointed counsel at the limited resentencing violated constitutional/right to counsel | Appointment not required for a limited restitution proceeding | Denial violated right to counsel at a critical stage (sentencing) | Held for Zrncic: resentencing limited to restitution is a sentencing (critical stage); counsel must be provided; restitution order vacated and case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Pleger, 934 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 2007) (restitution is part of sentence)
- Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119 (Pa. 2008) (right to counsel at critical stages; sentencing requires counsel)
- Commonwealth ex rel. Cavell v. Wright, 220 A.2d 611 (Pa. 1966) (constitutional right to counsel applies at sentencing)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendants entitled to counsel in state criminal proceedings)
- Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (due process requires counsel at critical stages)