809 S.E.2d 672
Va.2018Background
- In May 2016 Montgomery County voters filed a petition to remove Erica W. Williams, Clerk of the Circuit Court, alleging neglect, misuse of office, and incompetence after she terminated many employees for not supporting her reelection.
- The filing included a “Grounds for Removal” statement, 50 signatures expressly made “under penalty of perjury,” and over 1,800 additional registered-voter signatures not made under penalty of perjury.
- The circuit court issued a rule to show cause under Va. Code § 24.2-230 et seq.; Williams moved to quash, arguing the petition failed to meet Va. Code §§ 24.2-233 and 24.2-235 because only 50 signers attested under penalty of perjury rather than the ten-percent threshold.
- The Commonwealth argued the perjury-attestation requirement applies only to the person(s) who "make" the petition (i.e., drafters) and not to the broader set of signatories needed to meet the ten-percent threshold, relying on a 1989 Attorney General opinion.
- The circuit court quashed and dismissed the petition solely because the signatures equal to the ten-percent threshold were not all made under penalty of perjury.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed de novo whether the removal statutes require that the ten-percent signatories sign under penalty of perjury and affirmed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Va. Code §§ 24.2-233 and 24.2-235 require that the signatures equaling ten percent of votes cast be made under penalty of perjury | The Commonwealth: the perjury requirement in § 24.2-235 applies to the person(s) making/drafting the petition, not all signatories needed to meet the ten-percent threshold | Williams: the ten-percent signatories are the petitioners and thus must sign under penalty of perjury; petition deficient because not all ten-percent signatures were sworn | Court held the statutes read together require that the ten-percent signatories be signed under penalty of perjury; affirmed dismissal |
| Whether the Attorney General’s 1989 opinion and alleged legislative acquiescence control statutory interpretation | Commonwealth: AG opinion distinguishes makers/drafters from signers and legislative inaction implies acquiescence | Williams: AG opinion not binding; plain statutory text controls | Court found the AG opinion unpersuasive and gave precedence to the plain language of the statutes |
Key Cases Cited
- Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96 (statutory interpretation and de novo review)
- Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Malbon, 195 Va. 368 (removal statutes construed strictly)
- Johnson v. Woodard, 281 Va. 403 (prior case noted as not resolving maker/signer distinction)
- Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482 (weight of Attorney General opinions considered)
- Williams v. Augusta Cty. Sch. Bd., 248 Va. 124 (rejecting persuasive force of AG opinion when statutory language controls)