Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201

Wilgus, previously convicted of aggravated indecent assault, was classified as a sexually violent predator and subject to Megan's Law registration.
He was sentenced to five to ten years after resentencing that occurred without Megan's Law requirements being applied.
Upon release in 2007, he reported an intended address (1708 Market Street) to authorities.
No apartments were available at that address, and he slept at various places without informing authorities of a change of residence.
Megan's Law requires reporting current and intended residences and changes of residence within 48 hours; Wilgus failed to report a change after he stopped residing at 1708 Market Street.
Superior Court held he had no residence under the statute and discharged the charges; the Commonwealth appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 'residence' under Megan's Law includes homelessness.	Wilgus argues homelessness renders no reportable residence.	Commonwealth contends residence is defined by statute and includes intended or current locations.	No; statute defines residence and imposes reporting for changes even for homeless registrants.
Whether Wilgus’s lack of a fixed residence defeats a registration obligation.	State contends he had an intended residence at 1708 Market Street and thus a reportable change of residence occurred when he ceased residing there.	Wilgus maintains there was no residence to report and no change of residence when homeless.	Rejected; statutory change-of-residence notice applies to intended or current residences, including homeless situations.
Whether the statute is void for vagueness as applied to the homeless.	Homeless offenders are not adequately addressed by the fixed-residence definition.	Statute clearly defines residence and requires notification of changes.	Statute is constitutionally clear as applied; no vagueness in the registration requirements as to the homeless.
Whether Twine/Pickett control the interpretation of 'residence' for homeless registrants.	These cases support treating homelessness as not constituting a change of residence.	Pennsylvania's statute defines residence; Twine/Pickett are inapposite.	Twine/Pickett are inapplicable; plain statutory language governs.

Twine v. State, 395 Md. 539, 910 A.2d 1132 (Md. 2006) (defined residence for homeless offender context; not binding)
Pickett v. Washington, 95 Wash. App. 475, 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. App. 1999) (homeless registrants reporting changes; interpretive guidance)
Dowdy v. Michigan, 489 Mich. 373, 802 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 2011) (notify of new residence/change of domicile; homelessness not exempt)
Iverson v. Minnesota, 664 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 2003) (address/residence reporting context; implications for homeless)