Commonwealth v. Washington, T., Aplt.
2016 Pa. LEXIS 1536
| Pa. | 2016Background
- Appellant committed multiple armed robberies in 1996, was tried/convicted on many counts, and received an aggregate 35–70 year sentence in 1998 that included multiple five‑year mandatory minimums under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.
- Section 9712 directed imposition of five‑year mandatory minimums based on judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence and stated those facts were not elements of the offense.
- Appellant’s direct review concluded in 2006; he later filed a timely PCRA petition but did not raise a Sixth Amendment/Apprendi‑type challenge at the PCRA stage.
- In 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Alleyne, holding any fact that increases statutory penalty must be treated as an element and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, which cast doubt on statutes like § 9712.
- The Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed Alleyne sua sponte but denied collateral relief based on preservation/retroactivity principles; Judge Bowes dissented in part, urging Teague analysis for collateral review.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur limited to whether Alleyne renders the appellant’s mandatory sentences illegal on collateral review and affirmed the Superior Court, holding Alleyne is non‑retroactive on collateral review.
Issues
| Issue | Washington's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alleyne applies retroactively on collateral review so as to render § 9712 sentences illegal | Alleyne announces a new federal constitutional rule that makes mandatory minimums imposed after judge‑found facts illegal; PCRA provides relief for illegal sentences and the petition was timely | Alleyne is a new procedural rule (not substantive or watershed); Teague governs collateral retroactivity and Alleyne is not covered by its exceptions; finality and PCRA policy counsel against retroactivity | Alleyne is a new procedural rule and does not apply retroactively on collateral review; appellant’s sentence is not illegal under Alleyne |
| Whether Pennsylvania should adopt an independent, broader state retroactivity doctrine (invoking Danforth) | State courts should apply a fairness‑centered retroactivity test to remedy unreliable sentencing factfinding | State should follow Teague framework (and not relax retroactivity rules) to protect finality and respect PCRA limits | Court declines to adopt a broader state‑level retroactivity rule; adheres to Teague approach as default in PA |
| Whether Alleyne is substantive or watershed (Teague exceptions) | Alleyne’s inclusion of burden‑of‑proof implicates fundamental fairness and should be treated as substantive or watershed | Alleyne changes who decides facts and the burden; it does not decriminalize conduct or create a protected class and is not a watershed rule like Gideon | Alleyne is procedural, not substantive, and not a watershed rule; Teague exceptions do not apply |
| Whether a defendant can treat an Alleyne claim as an "illegal sentence" claim to avoid Teague limits | Alleyne claim equates to sentencing illegality under PA doctrine, enabling collateral relief | Legality depends on retroactivity: a new procedural rule cannot make a final sentence illegal unless it is retroactive | Court: illegality depends on whether the new rule applies retroactively; because Alleyne is non‑retroactive on collateral review, sentence is not illegal under Alleyne |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (any fact that increases statutory penalty is an element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (established rule that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum are elements for jury proof)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for collateral retroactivity of new constitutional rules; exceptions for substantive and watershed rules)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (procedural rules reallocating decisionmaking to jury are generally non‑retroactive on collateral review)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (discusses Teague and distinctions between substantive and procedural rules)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognized right to counsel as a watershed rule foundational to fair trials)
- McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (upheld judge‑found facts for mandatory minima under prior precedent later questioned by Alleyne)
- Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (reaffirmed McMillan; later overruled by Alleyne)