390 F. Supp. 3d 183
D.D.C.2019Background
- 1974 land-rights suit was resolved by a 1983 Settlement Agreement conveying ~485 acres ("Settlement Lands") to the Wampanoag Tribal Council; the Agreement stated the lands would remain subject to Massachusetts and local laws, including zoning and gaming, and preserved two exceptions (taxes and hunting).
- Massachusetts approved the Settlement Agreement (1985) and Congress ratified it in the 1987 Settlement Act, which expressly provided that Settlement Lands "shall be subject" to the Commonwealth's and town's civil/criminal laws (including laws that prohibit or regulate gaming).
- Massachusetts sued the Tribe in state court (dec. 2013) alleging breach and seeking a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement allows the Commonwealth to prohibit tribal gaming on Settlement Lands; the Tribe removed to federal court and counterclaimed.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth (Nov. 13, 2015) holding IGRA did not apply to the Settlement Lands and did not repeal the 1987 Settlement Act; final judgment (Jan. 5, 2016) also enjoined the Tribe from constructing/operating a gaming facility without complying with state and local laws and permitting requirements.
- The Tribe appealed raising three issues: (1) IGRA preemption of state gaming regulation, (2) whether the Tribe exercises sufficient governmental power under IGRA, and (3) whether the case could proceed without the NIGC as a party. The First Circuit reversed as to IGRA applicability and the repeal question and remanded "for entry of judgment in favor of the Tribe."
- On remand the district court addressed whether the First Circuit’s mandate reversed the district court’s separate, unappealed holding that the Tribe must comply with non-gaming state and local permitting laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IGRA applies to the Settlement Lands (preemption of state gaming laws) | Commonwealth: 1987 Settlement Act left state gaming regulation intact; IGRA does not apply | Tribe: IGRA preempts prior legislation and applies to Settlement Lands | Court: First Circuit held IGRA applies and reversed district court on gaming issues; district court entered judgment for Tribe on gaming |
| Whether IGRA effectually repeals the 1987 Settlement Act's gaming clause | Commonwealth: Settlement Act's parenthetical preserves state gaming regulation | Tribe: IGRA impliedly repeals or supersedes that clause | Court: First Circuit held IGRA supersedes the Settlement Act's gaming limitation (reversal) |
| Whether the Tribe exercises sufficient governmental power to qualify for IGRA | Commonwealth: Tribe insufficiently established governmental status over lands | Tribe: Tribe exercises sufficient governmental attributes to trigger IGRA | Court: First Circuit concluded IGRA applies (implying Tribe met required governmental attributes) |
| Whether Tribe must comply with non-gaming state/local permitting and regulations | Commonwealth: Final judgment required Tribe to comply with permitting; this portion was not appealed and should stand | Tribe: Mandate language "entry of judgment in favor of the Tribe" reverses entire district judgment, including permitting requirement | Court: District court declines to reverse unappealed permitting ruling; Tribe exempt from state/local gaming laws but must comply with all other applicable state/local laws and permitting requirements |
Key Cases Cited
- Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), 853 F.3d 618 (1st Cir.) (First Circuit reversed district court on IGRA applicability and Settlement Act repeal)
- Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994) (limited state jurisdiction under settlement acts; IGRA adjusts gaming-related portions)
- Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 1997) (mandate binds district court only as to issues actually decided on appeal)
- DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (issues not raised on appeal are waived)
- United States v. Matthews, 643 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (unchallenged appellate-stage rulings become law of the case)
- United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1993) (law-of-the-case doctrine and appellate preclusion principles)
- Hynning v. Partridge, 359 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (appellate reversal for "entry of judgment in favor" may restore parties to pre-judgment positions; discussed but distinguished)