Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255

Background

On March 29, 2003 police discovered 83‑year‑old James Sementelli murdered by blunt/sharp force trauma; his car was missing and later found being driven by Aaron Jones. Shanee Gaines identified Shonda Walter as the assailant and provided detailed incriminating statements. Walter was arrested and charged with first‑degree murder and theft; the Commonwealth sought death based on felony‑murder aggravator (theft of the car).
Trial counsel (appointed) faced repeated replacement requests from Walter; counsel did not present an opening statement at guilt phase, made limited cross‑examination, and conceded guilt in argument. Walter was convicted and the jury recommended death; initial direct appeal affirmed in 2009.
Walter filed a PCRA petition claiming ineffective appellate counsel; by agreement the PCRA court reinstated her right to a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. This opinion resolves that renewed direct appeal.
Major contested trial issues on appeal included: (1) alleged conflict/breakdown with appointed counsel and denial of replacement, (2) admission of certain testimonial and hearsay evidence (including Gaines’ statements and a mother’s testimony about Walter not denying charges), (3) pretrial publicity/change of venue, (4) notice of an additional Commonwealth witness (Emma Thompson), (5) admission of gruesome photos and exclusion/admission of certain defense evidence (Flippen), (6) jury instructions ("life means life"), prosecutorial conduct at penalty, and (7) a facial challenge to the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the death sentence, rejecting Walter’s claims on waiver, legal merit, or harmlessness, and finding no reversible error on venue, evidentiary rulings, notice of witness, or trial court discretion in admitting photographs.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Walter)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Ct.)	Held
Denial of replacement counsel / conflict of interest	Counsel had a broken relationship with Walter, disclosed case details to inmates, mishandled discovery and communication — entitling her to conflict‑free replacement under Holloway/Cuyler/Wood	Holloway/Cuyler/Wood concern active conflicts from multiple representation; Walter’s complaints were about performance/interpersonal issues, not concurrent conflicting clients	Denial of replacement did not violate Sixth Amendment conflict‑free counsel doctrine; Holloway line is inapplicable
Admission of mother's testimony that Walter did not deny charges (self‑incrimination)	Prosecutor elicited and court admitted testimony implying Walter’s silence, violating Doyle/self‑incrimination protections	No contemporaneous objection on self‑incrimination grounds; objection made only on best‑evidence grounds	Claim waived for failure to preserve specific Doyle objection; no review on merits
Admission of Gaines testimony (statements implicating Walter and blaming Mathis)	Gaines’ recounting of Mathis’ statements and other out‑of‑court remarks was inadmissible hearsay and violated confrontation/due process	Some statements were offered for effect on witness (state of mind/why they acted) and not for truth; trial court gave curative instruction when necessary	Court found no error: objectionable statement struck and curative instruction given; other statements admissible for non‑truth purposes
Change of venue / pretrial publicity	Local paper coverage was inflammatory, revealed prior record and alleged admissions, and saturated small county publicity pool; trial court abused discretion by denying venue change	Although publicity was inflammatory and pervasive, there was an 11‑month cooling‑off period; voir dire showed relatively low fixed bias and many jurors could be seated fairly	No abuse of discretion; cooling‑off plus voir dire responses defeated presumption of prejudice
Late notice of Commonwealth witness (Emma Thompson)	Thompson’s identity and statements were disclosed days before testimony; lack of advance notice prejudiced Walter’s ability to prepare/cross‑examine; required by discovery rules	No constitutional right to advance notice of all prosecution witnesses; Commonwealth located witness late and promptly disclosed; no showing of what additional preparation would have produced	Trial court acted within discretion; error, if any, was harmless given lack of specific prejudice shown
Admission of gruesome crime‑scene and autopsy photos	Photographs were cumulative, excessively gruesome, inflammatory and should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative	Photos were probative to show scene, wounds, defensive injuries and to aid officer/pathologist testimony; trial court limited images and gave cautionary instruction	No abuse of discretion; evidentiary value outweighed prejudice and jury presumed to follow instruction; some objections waived by counsel
Exclusion / preclusion of Flippen testimony (Mathis confession)	Flippen would testify Mathis confessed; that hearsay was admissible under exceptions (declarant‑against‑interest, Chambers) and necessary to present defense	At pretrial Buck hearing the court sustained Commonwealth objection because defendant could not relitigate factual sufficiency of aggravator; trial court never actually ruled to bar Flippen at trial and Flippen was not called	No preserved error — court did not preclude Flippen at trial and Walter failed to call him; claim fails
Jury instruction that "life means life" (no parole)	Walter requested instruction explaining life sentence carries no parole; omission harmed mitigation/future dangerousness analysis	No specific request or objection at charge conference; claim not preserved under Pa. R. Crim. P. 647(B)	Waived for failure to request or object; no relief
Prosecutorial conduct at penalty phase	Improper questioning linking lack of remorse to guilt, eliciting remarks beyond aggravators/mitigators, and inflammatory summation urging death	No contemporaneous objections to many questions and summation; claims forfeited and not preserved	Waived by failure to object contemporaneously; not reviewed on merits
Facial challenge to the death penalty	Death penalty is arbitrary and evolving standards of decency render it unconstitutional per se	Precedent upholding capital statute remains binding; narrowing of categories does not render death penalty per se unconstitutional	Rejected — not persuaded to declare Pennsylvania’s death penalty unconstitutional per se

Key Cases Cited

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (counsel conflict doctrine when same counsel represents co‑defendants with divergent interests)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (defendant must show actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance)
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (conflict when counsel’s loyalties divided by third‑party interests)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (post‑arrest silence cannot be used to impeach defendant’s exculpatory story)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (clarifies Holloway/Cuyler line; shows conflict doctrine focuses on active multiple representation conflicts)
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959) (addressing surprises in witness disclosure — discussed but not treated as holding of constitutional right to advance witness lists)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (trial court’s hearsay rules must not unduly infringe a defendant’s right to present a reliable defense)
Briggs v. Commonwealth, 12 A.3d 291 (Pa. 2011) (pretrial publicity analysis; factors for presumption of prejudice)
Casper v. Commonwealth, 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978) (pretrial publicity may in rare cases be so pervasive that prejudice is presumed)
Tharp v. Commonwealth, 830 A.2d 519 (Pa. 2003) (trial court best positioned to assess publicity effects; abuse‑of‑discretion review)