Commonwealth v. Veon
150 A.3d 435
| Pa. | 2016Background
- Michael R. Veon, longtime Pennsylvania state representative and co‑chair of a nonprofit (Beaver Initiative for Growth, “BIG”), was accused of diverting public grant funds administered through BIG to pay rent and expenses for several legislative offices and related uses.
- BIG received almost all funding from public sources (primarily DCED); Veon and a staffer (Perretta‑Rosepink) controlled hiring and expenditures. Some leased spaces were nominally BIG offices but functioned as Veon’s legislative offices.
- A jury convicted Veon of multiple counts, including conflict of interest (65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102–1103) and several theft and misapplication counts; trial court sentenced him and ordered $135,615 restitution payable to DCED.
- At trial the court instructed the jury that a “private pecuniary benefit” could include “intangible political gain” (e.g., favorable publicity, enhanced standing). The Commonwealth argued the case relied on intangible political benefits rather than direct personal receipt of money.
- The Superior Court affirmed most convictions but vacated part of the restitution order except $19,000 tied to the South Side office; the case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on (1) whether the Ethics Act’s “pecuniary benefit” extends to intangible political gain and (2) whether the Commonwealth (DCED) could receive restitution.
Issues
| Issue | Veon’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "private pecuniary benefit" in 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102 may include intangible political gain | Trial court and Commonwealth improperly treated intangible political benefits (favorable publicity, standing) as a pecuniary benefit; statute is vague/overbroad and chills political speech | The trial court’s instruction was permissible; political advantage that costs money or results from diverted funds qualifies as pecuniary benefit | Court holds pecuniary benefit requires private financial gain (monetary/economic). Jury instruction expanding the term to intangible political gain was erroneous; conviction for conflict of interest vacated and remanded for retrial. |
| Whether the trial court’s jury instruction error requires relief and what relief | Veon sought reversal based on statutory/constitutional challenge; implied sufficiency arguments that no monetary benefit was shown | Commonwealth relied on jury instruction and closing argument to support verdict; did not prove monetary gain | Court treats question as statutory interpretation first, finds instruction legally erroneous and prejudicial; vacates conviction for conflict of interest and remands for new trial (majority). |
| Whether DCED (a Commonwealth agency) is entitled to restitution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106 | Trial court ordered restitution to DCED; Commonwealth maintained DCED was a victim or reimbursable agency eligible for restitution | Veon argued DCED is not a "victim" as defined and is not entitled to restitution | Court holds DCED is not a “direct victim” under the Crime Victims Act definition incorporated by §1106 and did not reimburse a victim; restitution to DCED was unlawful and must be vacated. |
| Remedy after errors (scope of remand / dismissal) | Veon argued sufficiency/double jeopardy and sought discharge in some advocacy; favored dismissal of the charge given insufficient evidence of monetary benefit | Commonwealth urged retrial or remand for resentencing; urged that vacatur/remand should be limited | Majority: vacates entire judgment of sentence and remands for retrial on conflict‑of‑interest and resentencing; concurring/dissent would bar relief for waived instructional objections and would affirm conviction or dismiss charge (split views). |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (U.S. 2016) (statutory construction limits overbroad criminalization of political activity; guidance on remedy when element definitions change)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 981 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009) (interpreting §1106 restitution; agencies that reimburse victims may be restitution recipients)
- Commonwealth v. Runion, 662 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1995) (pre‑amendment holding that Commonwealth agencies are not "persons" eligible as victims for restitution under former §1106)
- Keller v. State Ethics Comm’n, 860 A.2d 659 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (facts involving mayor’s solicitation/donation of fees; discussed political/intangible benefits but is factually distinguishable)
- Commonwealth v. Garzone, 34 A.3d 67 (Pa. 2012) (limits on governmental reimbursement claims; restitution is statutory and not a general recovery for the state)
- Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136 (Pa. 2014) (discusses bribery and requirement of something of value; distinguishes pecuniary benefit from other benefits)