Commonwealth v. Veon
109 A.3d 754
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Michael R. Veon, a Pennsylvania State Representative and Democratic minority whip, co‑chaired a nonprofit (Beaver Initiative for Growth — BIG) that received DCED grant funds and leased office space later used substantially for Veon’s legislative offices.
- The Commonwealth charged Veon (and an aide) with various theft, misapplication, conspiracy, and conflict‑of‑interest offenses arising from use of BIG funds to pay rent/staffing for legislative offices.
- A jury convicted Veon on multiple counts (including 65 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(a) conflict of interest; theft by unlawful taking, deception, and failure to make required disposition; misapplication; and conspiracy).
- Trial court sentenced Veon to 12–48 months’ incarceration plus intermediate punishment and ordered restitution; the court later amended the restitution amount and Veon appealed.
- The Superior Court (Panel) affirmed convictions, quashed one duplicative appeal, upheld some restitution awards (Pittsburgh/South Side counts) but vacated and remanded restitution tied to counts where the verdict did not identify which office (Beaver Falls vs. Midland) the jury found theft occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Veon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether 65 Pa.C.S. §1103(a) (conflict of interest) is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad (facial & as‑applied). | Statute is sufficiently definite; it targets use of office authority or confidential info for private pecuniary benefit and does not infringe protected First Amendment activity. | Statute is vague/overbroad, reaches intangible political gain and protected speech; akin to vagueness concerns in Skilling. | Statute upheld. Not facially vague or overbroad; not vague as applied given evidence that Veon used BIG funds for political/pecuniary benefit. |
| 2. Whether trial court abused discretion permitting amendment of criminal information ("utilized" → "staffed"). | Amendment clarified the charged conduct without changing elements or adding offenses; no prejudice. | Change altered factual scenario and prejudiced defense. | Amendment allowed; court found no prejudice and no abuse of discretion. |
| 3. Whether variance/de facto amendment via verdict slip and jury clarification (which office) prejudiced defendant. | Clarification was immaterial to liability because core issue was misuse of BIG funds for Veon’s benefit. | Variance changed factual basis (multiple offices vs. single office) and prejudiced restitution calculation. | No prejudice to conviction; but ambiguity later affected restitution causation (see Issue 4). |
| 4. Whether Commonwealth can be a restitution "victim" and whether restitution amount was proper. | Commonwealth (DCED) may be victim when directly harmed; restitution amount was based on rent paid minus reimbursements. | Commonwealth cannot be a victim under restitution statute; amount speculative/excessive and not causally linked to jury’s verdict as to specific offices. | Commonwealth can be a victim. Restitution for Pittsburgh counts (where jury verdict was clear) affirmed; restitution for counts tied to Beaver Falls/Midland vacated and remanded because verdict ambiguity prevented causal link. |
| 5. Whether prosecutors’ alleged destruction of witness interview notes deprived Veon of a fair trial. | (Commonwealth) No evidence that prosecutors destroyed unrecorded material; issue was not established. | Destruction occurred and deprived Veon of Brady/material evidence. | Issue waived for improper incorporation-by-reference and lack of developed argument; trial court found no supporting evidence. |
| 6. Sufficiency of the evidence. | Evidence (grant applications, leases, testimony about BIG’s operations, rent flows) established misuse of funds and conflict of interest. | Evidence insufficient to prove elements of charged crimes. | Claim waived by inadequate Rule 1925(b) statement; on the merits Superior Court would affirm — evidence sufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (U.S. 2010) (void‑for‑vagueness analysis of federal honest‑services statute)
- Commonwealth v. Habay, 934 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 2007) (conflict‑of‑interest statute not unconstitutionally vague)
- Commonwealth v. Feese, 79 A.3d 1101 (Pa. Super. 2013) (rejecting Skilling‑based attack on state conflict statute)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 981 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009) (scope of restitution statute and which government entities qualify as victims)
- Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 2014) (conflict‑of‑interest statute does not restrict protected expression; prohibits using state resources for non‑de minimis private pecuniary gain)
- Commonwealth v. Stetler, 95 A.3d 864 (Pa. Super. 2014) (government can be victim under theft statutes affirmed)
- Commonwealth v. Plegler, 934 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 2007) (principles for computing restitution and need for record basis)
- Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. 2006) (standards for amendment of criminal information)
- Commonwealth v. Duda, 923 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2007) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine principles)