Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography (a sex offense) in 2008 and was placed on three years of probation with relief from registering as a sex offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (/).
The initial sentencing judge relieved him of the registration obligation after an evidentiary showing, and the Commonwealth did not appeal.
In 2010, after a new probation-violation hearing for a different charge (accosting and annoying a person of the opposite sex), a second judge found probation violated and sentenced him to 2.5 years with one year to serve.
The second judge ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender “as an additional condition of the terms and conditions of probation,” despite there being no express statutory authority to vacate the prior relief order.
The defendant appealed, arguing the second judge lacked authority to impose registration or revoke the relief; the court agreed and reversed the registration-imposing order.
The court clarifies that registration is a collateral consequence of conviction and not an express probation-condition authority granted to judges under the act.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a second judge may impose registration as a probation condition	Commonwealth: second judge may impose registration	Lenk: no statutory authority to impose	No; second judge lacks authority to impose registration as a probation condition.
Whether a second judge may revoke a prior relief from registration	Commonwealth: revocation implied after probation violation	Relief order cannot be automatically vacated	No; no statutory basis to automatically vacate prior relief from registration.
How to interpret the fourteen-day trigger in § 178E(/)	Commonwealth: triggering at each sentencing event	Words refer to same sentencing event	Plain language means fourteen days after the original sentencing if no immediate confinement.
Whether registration is a collateral consequence, not a judge-imposed probation condition	Commonwealth: broad construction supports second-judge authority	Registration is collateral and decided by SORB	Registration is a collateral consequence; no judicial authority to impose as a probation condition.

Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262 (Mass. 2007) (relief from registration under § 178E proper after evidentiary showing; board discretion; collateral consequence)
Commonwealth v. Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (collateral nature of registration consequences)
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (collateral consequence; registration decisions by board)
Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418 (Mass. 2001) (registration requirements triggered by conviction; initial duty to register)
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90 (Mass. 1998) (due process; hearing before registration)