Commonwealth v. Tighe
184 A.3d 560
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2018Background
- On May 29, 2012, J.E., a 15‑year‑old, was sexually assaulted; DNA and saliva evidence and an incriminating phone call supported the Commonwealth’s case.
- Patrick Tighe (Appellant) was tried pro se (with standby counsel Osborne), convicted of rape, IDSI, indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and sentenced to 20–40 years (including mandatory minimums).
- The trial court barred Appellant from personally cross‑examining the victim after finding he had contacted her while awaiting trial; stand‑by counsel was required to ask Appellant’s prepared questions.
- Appellant sought to recall the victim during his case‑in‑chief to impeach her with phone records; the court delayed ruling, allowed the victim to remain in court, and ultimately permitted recall with conditions (Appellant had to state questions in advance).
- Appellant raised multiple appellate claims (self‑representation limits, sequestration/mistrial, denial of substitute counsel, denial of independent DNA expert, impeachment limits, SVP designation and merger/resentencing issues); the Superior Court affirmed convictions but vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing due to merger and SVP issues.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Limitation on pro se defendant personally cross‑examining the victim | Prohibition violated Faretta self‑representation right; any restriction is impermissible | Restriction permissible to protect victim and preserve reliability; standby counsel asking defendant’s questions preserves core Faretta rights | Court upheld restriction: self‑representation right may be limited where necessary to protect a vulnerable witness and reliability is preserved (standby counsel asked defendant’s questions) |
| Delay/conditions on recalling the victim; victim remaining in courtroom; mistrial claim | Court’s sequestration breach and delay prejudiced impeachment; victim heard prior testimony and previewed questions, warranting mistrial | Court acted within discretion: sequestration order applied only until witnesses testified; requiring advance questions and delaying ruling reasonable; no prejudice shown | No abuse of discretion; no mistrial required; defendant waived some complaints and failed to show prejudice |
| Right to counsel / alleged irreconcilable differences with standby counsel Osborne | Appellant was effectively forced to proceed pro se because of conflict with Osborne; waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary | Appellant knowingly elected to proceed pro se after colloquy; he did not timely raise an irreconcilable conflict requiring substitute counsel | Waiver of counsel found valid; no denial of right to counsel (cases like Smith and Neal distinguished because here Appellant voluntarily chose pro se representation) |
| SVP designation, merger of convictions, and resentencing | Trial court improperly designated SVP and imposed a consecutive indecent assault sentence (should merge) | Commonwealth: SVP framework survived only so far as registration; merger depends on statutory elements | Court vacated SVP designation (Muniz/Butler reasoning), found IDSI and indecent assault merged (requiring vacatur of sentence and remand for resentencing); rape and indecent assault merger claim waived/treated separately |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (establishes Sixth Amendment right to self‑representation)
- Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (U.S. 1990) (Confrontation Clause allows limited face‑to‑face exceptions where necessary to protect child witness and reliability is preserved)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1984) (standby counsel may participate without automatically violating Faretta; focus on defendant’s ability to present defense)
- Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995) (permitting limitation on pro se defendant’s personal cross‑examination of child victims where core rights are otherwise preserved)
- Muniz v. Commonwealth, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (SORN/SV P procedures constitute punishment; fact‑finding standard implications)
- Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) (applies Muniz to conclude SVP statutory mechanism unconstitutional as applied; trial courts cannot hold SVP hearings under that regime)