325 A.3d 530
Pa.2024Background
- Michael L. Strunk was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a minor, including sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and unlawful contact with a minor.
- The unlawful contact conviction was challenged: there was no evidence Strunk communicated (verbally or non-verbally) to facilitate the sexual acts, aside from a whispered, nonthreatening comment after the first assault.
- The issue centered on the interpretation of "contact" in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318—whether it refers only to communicative conduct, or also to any physical touching.
- The trial and appellate courts held that physical touching alone could satisfy "contact," but Strunk argued that the statute targets only communication intending to facilitate sex offenses.
- The Supreme Court's concurring opinion by Justice Wecht concludes that "contact" in this context is limited to communication (including non-verbal communication), not mere physical touching.
- The opinion critiques reliance on legislative floor speeches for statutory interpretation, and calls for overruling prior precedent equating sexual conduct itself with unlawful contact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "contact" in § 6318 | Includes physical touching | Refers only to communicative behavior | "Contact" means communication, not touching |
| Need for evidence of communication | Touching is sufficient | Commonwealth must show some communicative act | Communication (verbal or non-verbal) required |
| Strict liability or intent needed | No need to prove intent (strict) | Intentional conduct required (not strict liability) | Intent is essential; not a strict liability offense |
| Scope of precedent (Commonwealth v. Velez) | Velez rightly finds contact in sexual act | Velez misapplies law, lacks communication requirement | Velez should be overruled, communication required |
Key Cases Cited
- Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2018) (regarding statutory interpretation and not adding terms to a statute)
- Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136 (Pa. 2014) (disfavoring strict liability for offenses absent clear legislative intent)
- Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022) (defining indecent assault and discussion of body parts)
- A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016) (ambiguity in statutory interpretation)
- Commonwealth v. Cousins, 212 A.3d 34 (Pa. 2019) (application of rule of lenity in penal statutes)