50 N.E.3d 184
Mass.2016Background
- In October 2014 a grand jury returned six indictments against Carlos Stevenson for aggravated rape of a child and multiple counts of indecent assault and battery on a child; the Commonwealth presented only the investigating officer (Detective Mark Santon) as a witness, who testified to what the complainant had told him.
- The complainant alleged a series of sexual assaults occurring from 2000 to 2003; some corroborative materials (a 2009 survey completed by the complainant and interviews of other witnesses) were introduced through Santon as hearsay.
- The defendant moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the Commonwealth relied exclusively on hearsay before the grand jury and that the complainant, who was available, should have testified; the judge granted dismissal without prejudice.
- The trial judge concluded the exclusive use of hearsay here created "extraordinary circumstances" because: (1) the experienced detective's presentation obscured possible inconsistencies; (2) jurors could not observe the complainant's demeanor; and (3) the Commonwealth's choice impaired the defendant's opportunity for pretrial discovery and potential impeachment.
- The Commonwealth appealed; the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and considered whether indictments based solely on hearsay are permissible and whether the particular facts here were extraordinary enough to require dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether indictments based solely on hearsay violate art. 12 or must be dismissed as a matter of law | Commonwealth: hearsay is permissible; grand jury may be informed by hearsay | Stevenson: hearsay never meets art. 12 due process; grand jury must hear direct testimony | The court reaffirmed that indictments may be based solely on hearsay and rejected a per se rule forbidding hearsay before the grand jury |
| Whether exclusive use of hearsay in this case created an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting dismissal | Commonwealth: no extraordinary circumstances; Santon provided detailed testimony and grand jurors could question him or request more witnesses | Stevenson: exclusive hearsay impaired grand jury function, deprived opportunity for discovery and demeanor assessment, and thus dismissal was warranted | The court held the facts were not extraordinary; dismissal was unwarranted and indictments were reinstated |
| Whether the passage of many years (delay) makes hearsay presentation inherently impermissible in sexual-assault prosecutions | Commonwealth: statutory scheme already addresses very long delays and requires corroboration only in certain cases; delay alone does not bar hearsay before the grand jury | Stevenson: 14-year delay increased risk of unreliability and required direct testimony | The court found delay alone does not create an extraordinary circumstance; statutes provide tailored safeguards for very long delays |
| Whether the prosecutor had an obligation to call the complainant to preserve defendant's pretrial discovery/impeachment rights | Commonwealth: no obligation to call witnesses before the grand jury; defendant had access to reports and was not denied discovery | Stevenson: by not calling complainant, prosecutor denied defendant access to grand jury testimony useful for impeachment | The court held the Commonwealth had no duty to present the complainant and the defendant was not entitled to require such testimony before the grand jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445 (1984) (reaffirmed that indictments may be based on hearsay; reversed dismissal where grand jury heard sufficient evidence)
- Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 (1982) (explains minimum grand jury showing: identity and probable cause; permits hearsay at presentment)
- Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650 (1979) (approves use of hearsay and emphasizes preference for direct testimony but allows hearsay presentments)
- Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743 (1985) (recognizes dismissal may be appropriate under extraordinary circumstances but upholds hearsay-based indictments generally)
- United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (federal precedent recognizing broad prosecutorial discretion in grand jury presentments and allowing hearsay)
- Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146 (1993) (places burden on defendant to show grand jury impairment and reiterates reluctance to probe evidentiary sufficiency before grand jury)