Commonwealth v. Staton, 12 A.3d 277

Staton was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after a jury found aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones.
Counsel was appointed as Staton’s seventh attorney; the trial court appointed current counsel in 2009.
Counsel moved to withdraw in July 2010 after Staton purportedly terminated representation and sought to represent himself.
Counsel argued the withdrawal should be denied; he also advanced a novel argument that the right to self-representation on appeal may not exist or may be limited.
The Court stayed briefing, and this decision addresses whether to permit withdrawal and potential self-representation on appeal.
The Court ultimately denied the Motion to Withdraw, directing counsel to file the appellate brief within fifteen days.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Staton has a right to self-representation on appeal in Pennsylvania	Staton’s claim of self-representation on appeal should prevail.	Pennsylvania may not recognize a right to self-representation on appeal, or it is not absolute.	Court assumes possible right but remains undecided; does not resolve it for withdrawal decision.
Whether counsel may withdraw given late-stage appellate proceedings	Counsel should be allowed to withdraw due to discharge by Staton.	Withdrawal is premature and would further delay already-delayed proceedings.	Motion to Withdraw denied; counsel directed to file brief within fifteen days.
Whether Martinez v. California affects Grazier-based self-representation on appeal	Martinez undermines Pennsylvania’s reliance on Faretta-based self-representation on appeal.	States may recognize self-representation on appeal under their constitutions or policy; Martinez does not foreclose this.	Court treats Martinez as controlling to the extent applicable but assumes a constitutional/policy basis may exist; not decisive for denial here.
Whether delaying argument to consider self-representation is justified	Right to self-representation should be timely considered.	Granting self-representation would disrupt and delay the appellate process.	Delay and disruption counsels against granting withdrawal at this stage.

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998) (establishes Grazer framework for waivers and pro se on appeal)
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (distinguishes trial vs. appellate self-representation; state right optional)
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 537 Pa. 581, 645 A.2d 223 (1994) (limits on pro se requests after counsel briefs filed)
Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 551 Pa. 96, 709 A.2d 849 (1998) (timeliness limits on self-representation in sentencing context)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (establishes right to self-representation at trial under Sixth Amendment)
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 398 Pa. Super. 538, 581 A.2d 595 (1990) (hybrid representation discussion in Pennsylvania appellate review)