Commonwealth v. St. Louis
473 Mass. 350
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Defendant (72) was convicted of multiple counts including indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability (G. L. c. 265, § 13F), indecent exposure, and accosting/annoying a person of the opposite sex based on incidents with Amy, a woman with significant intellectual disability (IQ 47; guardianship established).
- Alleged conduct occurred between ~2008 and Sept. 11, 2011; some acts predated the 2010 statutory language change that replaced “mentally retarded” with “person with an intellectual disability.”
- Facts the jury could find: repeated unwanted touching (breasts, vagina), the victim rubbing defendant’s penis over his pants, and one incident where defendant forced the victim’s head toward his penis intending oral sex; victim testified she felt uncomfortable and told him no.
- Defendant moved for required findings of not guilty at close of evidence and renewed them posttrial; motions were denied. He also moved for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
- On appeal the defendant argued (1) § 13F is unconstitutionally vague due to the term “intellectual disability,” (2) convictions violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because some acts occurred before the 2010 amendment, (3) insufficient evidence on consent and other elements, and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. The SJC affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of “intellectual disability” in § 13F | Commonwealth: term is a non-substantive nomenclature change and has a commonly accepted meaning derived from regulations and medical sources | St. Louis: term is a neologism lacking usual and accepted meaning, rendering the statute vague | Term is sufficiently clear; amendment was nomenclature only and not void for vagueness |
| Ex post facto challenge to convictions under amended § 13F | Commonwealth: amendment did not change substance; conduct was illegal before and after amendment | St. Louis: cannot be convicted under § 13F for acts before Nov 2, 2010 | No ex post facto violation; terms are synonymous and amendment had no retrospective substantive effect |
| Sufficiency of evidence — lack of consent for § 13F counts (Sept. 11, 2011) | Commonwealth: totality of circumstances (victim’s intellectual disability, age disparity, prior unwanted touching, victim’s refusal) supports lack of consent | St. Louis: insufficient evidence of nonconsent because victim engaged in some contact and one incident involved her touching him | Evidence sufficient for jury to find lack of consent; convictions supported |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to move to dismiss for vagueness, challenge sufficiency, request pre-amendment instruction) | Commonwealth: counsel’s failure reasonable because challenges would have failed | St. Louis: counsel was ineffective for not making those motions | Counsel not ineffective; proposed motions had minimal chance of success |
Key Cases Cited
- Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (void-for-vagueness principle for criminal statutes)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (fair notice requirement in vagueness doctrine)
- Spano, 414 Mass. 178 (statute must be understandable to a person of average intelligence)
- Bell, 442 Mass. 118 (statutory words given usual and accepted meanings; use of administrative definitions)
- Fuller, 421 Mass. 400 (use of department regulations to define mental retardation in § 13F context)
- Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on a required-finding motion)
- Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims)
- Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (Supreme Court usage and discussion of the term “intellectual disability")