Commonwealth v. Spotz, M., Aplt, 734 CAP

Mark Spotz was convicted and sentenced to death in Schuylkill and Cumberland Counties in 1996; direct appeals and certiorari were denied, rendering his judgments final in 1999–2003.
Spotz filed facially untimely PCRA petitions on June 16, 2016 asserting that Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States created a newly-recognized constitutional right that makes his petitions timely under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
Johnson invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “residual clause” as void-for-vagueness; Welch held Johnson announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review.
Spotz argued the federal residual clause is substantively identical to Pennsylvania’s § 9711(d)(9) death-penalty aggravator, so Johnson/Welch should render his claims timely.
Commonwealth and trial courts rejected Spotz’s argument, reasoning Johnson/Welch only invalidated a federal statute and did not establish a right that had already been held to apply retroactively to state § 9711(d)(9).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed dismissal: Spotz failed to satisfy the PCRA’s newly-recognized-constitutional-right exception, so courts lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Johnson/Welch satisfy the PCRA newly-recognized-constitutional-right exception to the one-year time bar	Spotz: Johnson/Welch announced a new constitutional rule that, because it mirrors § 9711(d)(9), makes his petitions timely under § 9545(b)(1)(iii)	Commonwealth: Johnson/Welch invalidate a federal statute only; no new right has been held to apply retroactively to Spotz’s state sentencing provision	Court: No — Johnson/Welch do not establish a right that has been recognized as retroactive for Spotz’s state-law aggravator; petitions untimely and jurisdiction lacking
Whether the similarity between the federal residual clause and § 9711(d)(9) makes Johnson’s rule applicable to state death-penalty sentencing	Spotz: The clauses are substantively similar so Johnson’s void-for-vagueness holding should extend to § 9711(d)(9)	Commonwealth: Any substantive extension to state law is a merits question and cannot be reached absent jurisdiction; existing Pennsylvania precedent upholds (d)(9)	Court: Declined to decide on the merits for lack of jurisdiction; noted prior Pennsylvania cases uphold (d)(9)

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA “residual clause” void-for-vagueness)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively)
Abdul‑Salaam v. Horn, 812 A.2d 497 (Pa. 2002) (interpretation of § 9545(b)(1)(iii) requiring the right have been held retroactive when petition filed)
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016) (PCRA one-year time bar is jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (statutory time bar limits court power to adjudicate untimely petitions)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules that apply retroactively)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules)
Commonwealth v. Williams, 863 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2004) (Pennsylvania precedent upholding (d)(9) against vagueness challenges)