Commonwealth v. Spanier
132 A.3d 481
Pa. Super. Ct.2016Background
- Graham B. Spanier, former Penn State president, was charged (perjury, obstruction, failure to report, EWOC, and related conspiracies) after a grand jury investigating Jerry Sandusky recommended charges following testimony by university general counsel Cynthia Baldwin.
- Baldwin, Penn State’s general counsel, accompanied Spanier to an OAG interview and to his grand jury testimony; she had previously represented the University and also met with Curley and Schultz.
- Baldwin did not follow University subpoena protocols fully; the OAG later subpoenaed Baldwin to testify before the grand jury about document production and related matters.
- Prior to Baldwin’s grand jury testimony the University waived its privilege as to documents but explicitly reserved communications between Baldwin and Curley/Schultz; the OAG agreed (on the record) not to probe privileged communications without a court ruling.
- At the grand jury Baldwin testified about her communications with Spanier (including advice about the grand jury and what Spanier told her); those statements formed part of the basis for charges against Spanier.
- The Superior Court held Baldwin breached the attorney-client privilege with respect to confidential communications with Spanier and was incompetent to testify about them, and it quashed the counts tied to her testimony (perjury, obstruction, and related conspiracy counts).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Spanier) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Baldwin represented Spanier in his individual capacity (creating an attorney-client privilege) | Spanier: Baldwin acted as his personal counsel for the OAG interview and grand jury; he reasonably believed she represented him and she advised/consulted him during testimony. | Commonwealth: Baldwin represented the University; any communications were corporate/agency matters, not personal, so no individual privilege. | Court: Baldwin did not make clear she was acting only as university counsel; an individual privilege existed and Baldwin’s testimony breached it. |
| Whether Baldwin’s grand jury testimony violated the attorney-client privilege and thus was incompetent | Spanier: Testimony disclosed confidential communications and thus was inadmissible; charges reliant on that testimony must be quashed. | Commonwealth: The University waived privilege for relevant materials; public statements by Spanier also waived any privilege. | Court: Baldwin’s testimony violated the privilege; she was incompetent to testify about Spanier’s confidential communications; related counts (perjury, obstruction, conspiracy) were quashed. |
| Whether Spanier waived the privilege by public statements (press release, TV interview) | Spanier: Public statements precharged do not effect a subject-matter waiver of privileged communications; Commonwealth never timely raised waiver at Baldwin’s testimony. | Commonwealth: Spanier’s public disclosures waived privilege as to related communications. | Court: No waiver. Spanier’s public statements did not eliminate privilege as to his communications with Baldwin. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406 (Pa. 1999) (discusses importance and scope of attorney-client privilege in criminal context)
- In re Investigating Grand Jury, 593 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1991) (attorney-client privilege principles and crime-fraud exception discussion)
- Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (corporate-client privilege and the need for Upjohn warnings)
- Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2011) (attorney-client privilege protects both attorney-to-client and client-to-attorney communications)
- Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986) (privilege protects confidential client disclosures and emphasizes public policy underpinning the rule)