Commonwealth v. Smyrnes, R., Aplt.
154 A.3d 741
| Pa. | 2017Background
- In February 2010 Jennifer Daugherty was detained, abused, tortured, and ultimately murdered after being brought to Ricky Smyrnes’s apartment with five co-perpetrators; Amber Meidinger later pled guilty and testified for the Commonwealth.
- Over several days the group humiliated and assaulted Daugherty (forced ingestion of substances, beatings, hair cutting, binding, sexual assault by Knight), then voted to kill her; Knight stabbed her fatally while Smyrnes participated (forcing a false suicide note, supplying the knife, slitting wrists, choking, moving the body).
- Smyrnes was convicted of first-degree murder (via accomplice/conspiracy theories), kidnapping, and other offenses; at penalty the jury found aggravators of torture and a significant history of violent felony convictions and imposed death.
- On direct appeal Smyrnes advanced 15 claims (evidentiary, discovery, expert-admissibility, sufficiency of aggravators, sentencing-phase challenges).
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviews sufficiency automatically in capital cases and affirmed the judgment of sentence, finding the evidence sufficient to support conviction and the two aggravators.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of guilt-phase evidence for 1st‑degree murder (accomplice theory) | Smyrnes argued he was not the actual killer and challenged aspects of culpability | Evidence showed Smyrnes led the group, participated in planning, directed actions, supplied weapon — supports vicarious liability with specific intent inferred | Affirmed — evidence sufficient to support first‑degree murder via accomplice/conspiracy liability |
| Brady/Giglio disclosure regarding Meidinger plea/leniency | Smyrnes claimed prosecution failed to disclose an alleged plea agreement that would impeach Meidinger | Meidinger testified at trial she had no plea deal; post‑trial plea does not prove pretrial agreement; assertion speculative | Denied — claim unsupported and speculative; no relief |
| Exclusion of defense expert testimony on conspiracy intent/agreement (Dr. Applegate) | Smyrnes sought to admit psychiatric testimony to negate conspiracy agreement/intent (claimed mental retardation) | Defense repeatedly disavowed presenting expert testimony on specific intent; Weinstein allows psychiatric evidence only when it addresses cognitive functions relevant to specific intent | Denied — admission precluded properly because proffer did not address the specific‑intent cognitive functions Weinstein permits |
| Hearsay: victim's out‑of‑court statements through Meidinger | Smyrnes argued victim statements admitted improperly; trial court purportedly treated them as excited utterances | Trial judge refused blanket preclusion and reserved rulings; defense did not timely object on the record to specific statements | Unpreserved — argument forfeited; no review on merits |
| Cross‑examination limits re: Meidinger’s medication/intoxication and memory | Smyrnes contended court unreasonably limited cross‑examination about witness’s medication effects on perception/recall | Court limited inquiry to time surrounding February 2010; defense questions were overly general and not properly proffered | No abuse of discretion — scope of cross limited appropriately; proffer insufficient to show relevance/prejudice |
| Admission of photograph of victim | Smyrnes argued photo was outdated and prejudicial (elicited sympathy) | Photo was relevant to show victim appearance before hair was forcibly cut and corroborate abuse testimony; limited use by prosecutor | Admissible — trial court did not abuse discretion given relevance to hair‑cutting/abuse episode |
| Torture aggravator (42 Pa.C.S. §9711(d)(8)) applicability to accomplice | Smyrnes argued torture aggravator cannot apply where accomplice (Knight) physically killed the victim (relied on Lassiter logic) | Commonwealth relied on Daniels and statutory text; §9711(d)(8) is phrased passively (“offense was committed by means of torture”) and can encompass accomplice liability | Affirmed — torture aggravator may apply where defendant, though not the actual instrumentality, intentionally participated in torture that was linked to the killing |
| Use of juvenile adjudications and burglary convictions for (d)(9) aggravator | Smyrnes argued juvenile adjudications (age 11) and burglary-type convictions should not qualify as violent felony history for aggravation | Pretrial concession and controlling precedent (Baker, Rios) allow juvenile adjudications and burglary as crimes of violence for (d)(9); preservation issues | Denied — claims waived/unpreserved; precedent supports using those adjudications/convictions for (d)(9) |
| Expert pathologist testimony (Dr. Wecht) on intent to inflict pain/torture | Smyrnes argued Wecht lacked psychiatric credentials to opine about intent/torture and such testimony usurped jury role | Pathologists may testify about pain and suffering and circumstantial indicia of intent; Pa.R.E. 704 allows opinions on ultimate issues; preservation of specific objections was lacking | Not reviewed in detail (preservation issues); court upheld admission under existing precedent when preserved issues considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211 (Pa. 2009) (capital sufficiency review standard)
- Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2008) (accomplice liability requires proof defendant personally harbored specific intent to kill)
- Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 2007) (elements of first‑degree murder include specific intent and malice)
- Commonwealth v. Strong, 761 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 2000) (Giglio/Brady principles on witness leniency and impeachment)
- Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 451 A.2d 1344 (Pa. 1982) (permitting psychiatric testimony only when it speaks to cognitive functions underlying specific intent to kill)
- Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994) (torture aggravator applied in accomplice liability context)
- Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1998) (narrow construction of "committed" in (d)(6) in‑perpetration aggravator)
- Commonwealth v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35 (Pa. 2009) (course‑of‑conduct can be considered for torture aggravator)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017 (Pa. 2012) (forensic testimony about pain/suffering and intent in aggravator context)