Commonwealth v. Smith
473 Mass. 798
Mass.2016Background
- On Aug. 24, 2010 Michelle Diaz was shot while sitting in her car; she died days later. Surveillance footage and witness reports placed a male fleeing the scene but did not clearly identify him.
- Police investigation led to William Madison, Kassie Ago, and Kenny Roman, who later entered cooperation agreements and testified that Donovan K. Smith participated in a planned robbery and was the person who entered the victim’s car that day.
- Smith (age 18) was arrested on Oct. 6, 2010 and interrogated by Worcester detectives for ~95 minutes; he was Mirandized and signed a waiver. He initially denied involvement but later admitted participation in the robbery plan and being in the victim’s car, denied shooting her.
- During the interview Smith said, “I’m done” / “I don’t wanna talk no more,” a clear invocation of his right to cut off questioning; detectives continued a lengthy effort to elicit more statements and succeeded in obtaining inculpatory admissions. Detectives then left him alone for ~6 minutes while recording continued; an enhanced audio version captured a muttered volunteered statement.
- At trial the recorded interview (including the post‑invocation portions and the enhanced audio of the volunteered remark) was admitted; the jury convicted Smith of first‑degree murder (felony‑murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty) and attempted armed robbery. Smith appealed.
- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed: it held the police failed to scrupulously honor Smith’s invocation of the right to silence, rendering post‑invocation statements inadmissible; the admission likely caused a miscarriage of justice. The Court also ruled extreme atrocity/cruelty was not supported by the evidence, so only felony‑murder may be pursued on retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Smith's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith clearly invoked his right to cut off questioning | Invocation ambiguous; subsequent answers show he did not intend to stop | “I’m done” / “I don’t wanna talk no more” was a clear, unequivocal invocation that required immediate cessation | Smith clearly invoked; police failed to honor it; post‑invocation statements inadmissible |
| Whether police complied with Mosley factors (scrupulous honor) | Interrogation was appropriate; follow‑up clarification justified; continued questioning lawful | Police did not immediately cease, did not give fresh Miranda warnings, continued same subject matter — violating Mosley | Police did not scrupulously honor invocation: no immediate cessation, no fresh warnings, same subject matter; suppression valid |
| Admissibility of volunteered statement made while Smith was alone and later enhanced | Volunteered remark admissible independent evidence; enhancement simply clarified words | Recording was produced by an illegality (failure to stop recording after invocation); enhancement exploited that illegality and should be excluded under Wong Sun | Post‑invocation volunteered remark (and its enhanced audio) were fruit of the primary illegality and inadmissible |
| Whether admission of the statements was harmless | Cooperating witnesses corroborated key facts; other evidence supported conviction; error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Smith’s own admissions were highly probative and likely decisive; admission created substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice | Admission likely affected jury verdicts; reversal required; retrial permitted only on felony‑murder theory |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishing warnings and right to cut off questioning)
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (right to cut off questioning must be scrupulously honored; factors for evaluating post‑invocation interrogation)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (evidence obtained by exploitation of illegality may be fruit of the poisonous tree)
- Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721 (clarity required for invocation; context fact‑specific)
- Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273 (police may ask a clarifying question but should generally limit follow‑ups)
- Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216 (factors for extreme atrocity/cruelty jury instruction)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (confession is highly probative and potentially dispositive evidence)