Commonwealth v. Shifflett, G., Aplt.
26 MAP 2024
| Pa. | May 30, 2025Background
- The case involves George Thomas Shifflett, who in 2012 was charged with DUI and admitted to Pennsylvania's Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program, a diversionary program for first-time offenders.
- In 2022, Shifflett was charged with another DUI, and the Commonwealth sought to treat his prior ARD as a "prior offense" for sentencing purposes under Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code.
- Section 3806(a) provides that ARD acceptance counts as a prior offense for DUI sentencing enhancements.
- Shifflett challenged the use of his prior ARD as a sentencing enhancer on the grounds that ARD lacks procedural safeguards like a jury trial or requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent (Apprendi and Alleyne).
- The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Section 3806(a) unconstitutional on its face, as ARD lacks the procedural protections attached to convictions or guilty pleas.
- Justice Brobson's dissent asserts that by accepting ARD, defendants knowingly waive certain constitutional rights, so Section 3806(a) is not unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Shifflett's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can prior acceptance of ARD count as a "prior offense" for DUI sentencing enhancement under Section 3806(a)? | ARD lacks constitutional safeguards, so it cannot be treated as a conviction for enhancement. | Acceptance into ARD is voluntary and defendants knowingly waive procedural rights, making its use as a prior offense lawful. | The majority held Section 3806(a) unconstitutional, as ARD lacks required constitutional protections; Brobson dissented. |
| Does acceptance into ARD constitute a valid waiver of rights under Apprendi and Alleyne? | General ARD process does not ensure that the waiver of rights is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as required by Apprendi/Alleyne. | Waiver can occur by request for ARD itself, and many counties already require explicit waivers. | Majority found the process deficient; dissent argued a defendant’s ARD request should be deemed sufficient waiver. |
| Should the statute be declared facially unconstitutional or could an "as-applied" remedy suffice? | The lack of safeguards in all applications of ARD means statute is facially invalid. | Any defect is procedural and can be remedied by better advisements/colloquies, not by striking statute. | Majority found statute facially unconstitutional; dissent favored as-applied relief and amending procedures. |
| Impact on ARD program and legislative intent? | Not directly addressed in arguments. | Striking the statute undermines balance between rehabilitation and deterrence, potentially discouraging ARD use. | Majority ruling may affect ARD’s use; dissent sees broader negative policy implications. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury).
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (any fact increasing a mandatory minimum must be submitted to a jury).
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (defendants can waive rights under the Apprendi rule).
- Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (prior convictions can be exceptions to the jury trial rule for sentencing enhancements).