Commonwealth v. Sepheus
468 Mass. 160
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Defendant (Sepheus) arrested Sept. 30, 2009 near a convenience store in a high-crime area; police were searching for him on outstanding warrants.
- Search of defendant revealed three rocks of crack cocaine (~0.4 g total) and $312; no smoking device or packaging paraphernalia found.
- Multiple officers observed one group member (Griffith) engaged in what officers believed was a narcotics transaction; no evidence the defendant participated.
- Detective John Wadlegger (Commonwealth expert) testified the packaging was consistent with street-level distribution and opined defendant was a dealer, citing an informant tip; some of this testimony was nonresponsive and included hearsay.
- Defendant convicted after bench trial of possession with intent to distribute (G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(c)); Appeals Court affirmed; Supreme Judicial Court granted further review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Sepheus) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for intent to distribute | Packaging, amount of money, location (high-crime), Griffith’s suspected sale, absence of smoking device, and expert opinion together support intent to distribute | Amount (0.4 g), packaging, cash and absence of paraphernalia insufficient; no nexus to Griffith’s conduct; weak inference from lack of smoking device | Affirmed that overall evidence can support intent, but critical expert testimony altered outcome (conviction reversed for trial error reason) |
| Confrontation Clause re: expert relying on informant hearsay | Expert’s disclosure of hearsay was offered only as basis for opinion, not truth; expert testified and was cross-examined, so no Sixth Amendment violation | Admission of informant-based statements through expert violated Sixth Amendment (testimonial hearsay) | No Sixth Amendment violation: expert testified and was cross-examined; judge in bench trial presumed to limit use to basis of opinion |
| Improper expert opinion (express opinion of defendant’s guilt) | Expert’s opinion was within permissible limits to explain inferences | Expert improperly expressed ultimate opinion and cited informant tip; that testimony was nonresponsive and prejudicial; counsel failed to move to strike | Trial counsel ineffective for failing to move to strike nonresponsive, improper testimony; without that testimony Commonwealth lacked sufficient proof of intent to distribute; conviction reversed and new trial ordered |
| Remedy and retrial options | N/A | N/A | Reversal of conviction on ineffective assistance grounds; Commonwealth may retry for intent-to-distribute or seek conviction on lesser included offense of simple possession; prosecutor may call the informant at retrial if available |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (applying Jackson standard in Massachusetts)
- Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633 (1997) (intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576 (1998) (limits on expert testimony expressing ultimate opinion of guilt)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (Confrontation Clause principles regarding testimonial hearsay)
- Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality on expert testimony and hearsay; discussed but not controlling here)