Commonwealth v. Scott
467 Mass. 336
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Annie Dookhan, a chemist at the Hinton drug lab (2003–2012), admitted to extensive misconduct ("dry-labbing," contaminating samples, forging logs) affecting thousands of drug analyses; she pleaded guilty to multiple charges arising from that conduct.
- Rakim D. Scott admitted to sufficient facts (treated as a guilty plea) in Sept. 2011 to a drug-possession charge; the Hinton lab certificate in his case bears Dookhan’s signature as an assistant analyst.
- After Dookhan’s misconduct became public, Scott moved under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) to withdraw his plea, arguing that government misconduct made his plea involuntary and that nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence violated due process.
- The motion judge (who was also the plea judge) granted Scott’s motion without findings; the Commonwealth appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court took direct review.
- The Court applied the Ferrara two-pronged framework: (1) whether egregious government misconduct preceded the plea and affected the defendant’s case; (2) whether the misconduct materially influenced the defendant’s decision to plead.
Issues
| Issue | Scott’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dookhan’s wrongdoing in cases where she signed the drug certificate constitutes egregious government misconduct attributable to the Commonwealth | Dookhan’s false testing/certifications undermined Scott’s case; her signature shows she participated in the testing | Misconduct does not affect voluntariness of plea; plea admission is conclusive as to factual basis | Where Dookhan signed as primary or secondary chemist, court conclusively presumes egregious government misconduct attributable to Commonwealth and occurring in defendant’s case |
| Whether defendant must show nexus between misconduct and his specific case | Scott argued Dookhan’s signature on the certificate supplies the necessary nexus | Commonwealth argued Scott failed to show Dookhan misbehaved in his particular case | Court held a drug certificate signed by Dookhan as assistant analyst is sufficient to establish the nexus (special rule limited to these circumstances) |
| Whether defendant must show the misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead (Ferrara prong two) | Scott contended the newly discovered misconduct would have affected his plea decision | Commonwealth argued Scott failed to assert or prove any influence on plea decision | Court remanded for factual findings: defendant retains burden to show a reasonable probability he would not have pled had he known; vacated grant without resolving materiality |
| Whether other remedies/claims (newly discovered evidence, Brady) remain available after plea | Scott asserted newly discovered evidence and Brady claims as alternative bases to vacate plea | Commonwealth argued voluntary, intelligent plea waives pre-plea claims; Ferrara analysis controls | Court did not resolve waiver question; held Ferrara voluntariness/materiality inquiry dispositive — if prong two fails, other claims likely fail; remand to assess materiality |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006) (two-pronged test for vacating plea based on government misconduct: egregiousness/nexus and material influence on plea)
- Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30 (Mass. 2011) (reasonable-probability prejudice standard for vacating guilty plea for ineffective assistance)
- Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (Mass. 2004) (superintendence power to regulate presentation of evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (Mass. 2013) (context on systemic impact of Hinton lab investigation)
- United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirmative government misrepresentation in affidavit can render plea involuntary)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (reasonable-probability test for prejudice in plea-withdrawal ineffective-assistance claims)
- Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (U.S. 1973) (entry of a voluntary guilty plea generally waives pre-plea constitutional claims)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (requirement that plea be voluntary and intelligent)