491 Mass. 706
Mass.2023Background
- In late 2013–Jan 1, 2014, Michael Schoener (a Dedham police officer) repeatedly purchased Percocet from James Feeney and, at Feeney's requests, obtained and delivered the victim's BOP record and RMV/driver information to Feeney.
- Schoener lent Feeney his Dedham police badge, holster, and handcuffs days before New Year’s Day; Feeney thereafter showed those items and the victim’s records to co‑defendants who posed as probation officers.
- On January 1, 2014, Feeney directed Scott Morrison and Alfred Ricci to impersonate officers, handcuff the victim, take him to a garage where Feeney later killed him, and then dispose of the body in the woods.
- Schoener continued to obtain pills from Feeney afterward; Feeney returned Schoener’s equipment on Jan 1 without explanation. The victim’s remains were found about a year later; items in Feeney’s apartment bore the victim’s blood/DNA.
- Schoener was indicted and convicted as an accessory before the fact to kidnapping under G. L. c. 274, § 2 (charged as accomplice liability). On appeal he challenged sufficiency of evidence on knowledge/intent, several jury instructions, and exclusion of his post‑indictment statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Schoener knowingly participated and shared intent to kidnap | Evidence of relationship, repeated provision of target’s records, and loan of badge/handcuffs/holster permitted inference Schoener knew and was willing the items be used to confine the victim | Schoener argued he was naïve, lent items innocently (or for innocuous uses), and there was no direct evidence he knew of or intended a kidnapping | Court: Evidence sufficient—circumstantial inferences (items’ nature + timing + animosity) permitted a rational jury to find knowing participation/shared intent |
| Jury instruction treating “assistance/aid/encouragement” as relevant conduct for accessory before the fact | Commonwealth: unified accomplice liability theory covers aiding, procuring, counseling as alternative ways to show knowing participation | Schoener: instruction blurred distinction between accessory before fact and aiding/abetting and risked finding guilt without knowing participation | Court: No error—Marshall/Zanetti framework endorses unified theory; instruction properly conveyed knowing participation requirement |
| Jury instructions on knowledge/intent, trickery, and contingent intent | Commonwealth: instructions adequately explained knowledge vs intent and allowed contingent intent doctrine | Schoener: requested different wording; argued judge failed to define "knowledge" explicitly, wrongly referenced kidnapping by trickery and diluted intent requirement via contingent intent language | Court: No reversible error—judge’s overall charge and later jury clarification properly explained knowledge, intent, and that contingent intent can suffice |
| Exclusion of Schoener’s August 6, 2014 statements (hearsay/verbal completeness/impeachment) | Commonwealth: statements were hearsay and not admissible under state‑of‑mind exception or verbal completeness; not opened by witness testimony | Schoener: statements showed his state of mind and could impeach officer testimony or be admitted under verbal completeness | Court: No abuse of discretion—statements were hearsay explaining past conduct and not within state‑of‑mind exception; August 6 interview was separate from July 24 and not admissible under verbal completeness; impeachment argument failed |
Key Cases Cited
- Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529 (2012) (endorses unified theory of accomplice liability—knowing participation and shared intent are essential)
- Zanetti v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 449 (2009) (accomplice liability framework and treatment of accessory/aiding concepts)
- Richards v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 299 (1973) (contingent or conditional intent can support accessory liability)
- Kilburn v. Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 31 (1997) (knowledge/intent often proven by inference from facts and circumstances)
- Latimore v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (standard for required finding of not guilty—view evidence in prosecution's favor)
- Witkowski v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 675 (2021) (definition of "confinement" as any restraint of a person's liberty)
- Gray v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 293 (1996) (badge identifies holder as officer and conveys lawful authority)
- Noble v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 341 (1994) (circumstantial evidence including disguise and targeting supports inference of knowing assistance)