Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767

Background

On April 26, 2012, Detective Amaral followed and stopped a vehicle he had previously encountered while assisting a narcotics surveillance team after detecting the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the moving vehicle.
Amaral had no observed traffic violation prior to the stop; after stopping, he saw the driver holding a marijuana cigar, confiscated it, requested license/registration, and the stop continued.
During the encounter police discovered a bag with sixty Percocet pills; the passenger (defendant) was charged with drug offenses related to the pills.
Defendant moved to suppress the pill evidence on the ground the initial stop was improper; the motion judge denied suppression, finding the odor plus other suspicious activity justified the stop.
The Commonwealth conceded the odor alone did not give probable cause to believe a criminal offense occurred under post‑2008 decriminalization (possession ≤1 ounce is a civil offense), but argued officers may stop vehicles on reasonable suspicion to issue civil citations analogous to traffic stops.
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a stop based on reasonable suspicion of a civil marijuana infraction (odor of burnt marijuana) violated art. 14 (and the Fourth Amendment analysis) because it was not sufficiently tied to highway safety nor consistent with decriminalization's objectives.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether odor of burnt marijuana alone permits a stop of a moving vehicle to investigate a civil marijuana possession infraction	Commonwealth: decriminalization creates civil enforcement mechanism; like traffic infractions, officers may stop vehicles on reasonable suspicion to issue civil citations	Defendant: odor alone at most supports reasonable suspicion of a civil infraction but not probable cause; stop was unlawful	Held: Stop unconstitutional — odor supported only reasonable suspicion of a civil infraction; stops for such infractions are not justified absent probable cause because they do not advance highway safety and undermine decriminalization policy
Whether odor of marijuana still supplies probable cause to believe marijuana is present after decriminalization	Commonwealth: odor indicates marijuana nearby and thus probable cause for enforcement	Defendant: decriminalization limits inference; odor may reflect past smoking or third‑party use, not present possession	Held: Odor of burnt marijuana can support reasonable suspicion of a civil possession offense but, in this context, does not establish probable cause to believe a criminal offense has occurred
Whether statutes authorizing noncriminal disposition (G. L. c. 94C §32N; c. 40 §21D) implicitly allow stopping moving vehicles to issue marijuana civil citations	Commonwealth: statutory scheme (and analogy to c. 90C traffic statutes) implies officers must be able to stop moving vehicles to deliver citations	Defendant: even if statutory authority exists, constitutional limits apply	Held: Court did not decide statutory authority question; held constitutional constraints (Fourth Amendment/art. 14) preclude stops based on mere reasonable suspicion of a civil marijuana offense
Proper standard (reasonable suspicion vs probable cause) for vehicle stops to enforce civil marijuana possession	Commonwealth/Dissent: reasonable suspicion suffices (analogous to civil traffic stops); odor gives probable cause	Majority: because civil marijuana possession enforcement is unrelated to road safety and decriminalization intended to reduce intrusion, stops based on mere reasonable suspicion are unreasonable; probable cause required	Held: Reasonable suspicion alone insufficient in this context; stop here violated art. 14

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459 (interpreting effect of 2008 decriminalization; odor alone does not justify exit orders or searches)
Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16 (odor of marijuana insufficient for probable‑cause vehicle search post‑decriminalization)
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746 (odors may not establish probable cause for DUI or vehicle search without other indicia)
Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43 (pre‑decriminalization: odor of marijuana can supply probable cause)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (random vehicle stops unconstitutional; balancing test for stops without individualized suspicion)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (objectivity of reasonable suspicion/probable cause for stops; driver’s subjective motivation irrelevant)
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 430 Mass. 577 (art. 14 analysis and limits on suspicionless roadblocks)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 464 Mass. 758 (describing policy goals of decriminalization statute)
Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32 (reasonable suspicion justifies investigatory stop for civil traffic infractions)
Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891 (probable cause as a matter of practical probabilities)
Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46 (standard of review on motions to suppress)
Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24 (post‑decriminalization treatment of marijuana odor evidence)