492 Mass. 1
Mass.2023Background
- April 23, 2018: multiple reports (including a 911 caller) and ShotSpotter alerts of gunfire near Annunciation Road; witnesses described two Black males in black hoodies on bicycles heading south.
- Within minutes officers (youth violence strike force, plainclothes in an unmarked SUV but wearing tactical vests) located two young Black males wearing black hoodies walking on Columbus Avenue ~0.8–1 mile from the scene about seven minutes after the shootings.
- Officers drove past, turned around, exited the SUV, told the men to "hold up," then, after observing furtive movements and one juvenile’s reflexive turn, conducted pat frisks and recovered concealed handguns from both individuals.
- Defendant was indicted for firearm offenses and moved to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment/art. 14 grounds (lack of reasonable suspicion) and on equal protection/selective enforcement grounds, submitting statistical evidence showing 90% of stops by two officers were of Black individuals.
- Trial judge denied suppression, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk and that the Commonwealth rebutted any inference of racial motivation; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the pedestrians | Officers lacked particularized suspicion: description was generic (Black males in black hoodies) and the men were on foot, not on bicycles, nearly a mile from the shooting | Stop was supported by proximity in time and location to shooting, matching clothing, observed nervous/evasive behavior, and public-safety risk from an active shooting | Stop was reasonable under the totality of circumstances (convergence of proximity, timing, furtive behavior, flight path, and public-safety concerns) |
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to pat-frisk for weapons | Frisk was unsupported because no observed indicia of weapons or threatening conduct | Discovery of furtive movements and the context of an active shooting justified a protective frisk | Frisk was lawful given reasonable suspicion that suspects were armed and dangerous at the time of the stop |
| Whether the Long equal-protection standard for traffic stops applies to pedestrian/threshold inquiries | Long should apply to pedestrian stops; statistical evidence and burden-shifting should govern | Commonwealth argued Long limited to vehicle stops and traditional Franklin three-part test should remain | Court held Long’s revised, more-accessible standard applies to pedestrian stops and other investigative practices (i.e., defendant need only raise an inference of discriminatory motive; burden shifts to Commonwealth) |
| Whether the Commonwealth rebutted inference of discriminatory policing based on statistics | Statistical evidence (FIO data) showed officers disproportionately stopped Black people, creating a prima facie inference of racial motivation | Commonwealth offered race-neutral, contemporaneous investigatory reasons (911 witness description including race, matching observations by another officer, timing/direction consistent with flight from shooting) | Commonwealth rebutted the inference; judge did not err in finding the stop motivated by investigation of a nearby shooting rather than race |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (adopted relaxed burden-shifting standard for establishing racial motivation in traffic stops)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established investigatory stop and frisk standard)
- Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530 (general description alone insufficient for reasonable suspicion)
- Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691 (contextual factors and juvenile vulnerability in threshold inquiries)
- Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95 (totality of facts test for reasonable suspicion)
- Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231 (convergence of factors can create reasonable suspicion)
- Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885 (traditional three-part test for selective enforcement claims)
- Lora v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 425 (discussion of presumption of regularity and equal protection challenges)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (equal protection—independent basis from Fourth Amendment)