Commonwealth v. Ricker, D., Aplt.
41 MAP 2016
| Pa. | Sep 28, 2017Background
- Appellant David Ricker faced charges and a preliminary hearing in Dauphin County where the Commonwealth’s prima facie case relied principally on a taped interview of Trooper Michael Trotta.
- The Commonwealth also presented live testimony from Trooper Douglas Kelley, which the dissent views as tangential corroboration rather than an independent basis for any element.
- The Superior Court held that Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E) allows hearsay to establish “any” element of an offense, effectively permitting a prima facie case to rest entirely on hearsay.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review (later dismissed as improvidently granted by the majority), and Justice Wecht filed a dissenting statement addressing the merits.
- Justice Wecht concluded Rule 542(E) is ambiguous as to whether “any” means one, some, or all elements, and resolved the ambiguity by invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance and due process concerns.
- He held that a prima facie bind-over may not be based exclusively on inadmissible hearsay and ordered that Ricker be afforded a new preliminary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 542(E)’s phrase “Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered…any element of an offense” permits a prima facie bind-over based entirely on inadmissible hearsay | Commonwealth: Rule 542(E) permits hearsay to establish any element; thus hearsay may supply all elements at preliminary hearing | Ricker: Allowing hearsay-only bindovers violates due process; preliminary hearings must rest on legally competent evidence beyond hearsay alone | Justice Wecht: Rule 542(E) is ambiguous; applying constitutional avoidance, “any” cannot mean “all.” A prima facie case cannot rest exclusively on inadmissible hearsay; Ricker entitled to new preliminary hearing |
| Whether due process prohibits binding a defendant over for trial based solely on inadmissible hearsay | Commonwealth: Preliminary hearings are limited, and hearsay is expressly considered by Rule 542(E) | Ricker: Due process requires a meaningful hearing — counsel’s cross-examination and the magistrate’s assessment cannot be rendered hollow by hearsay-only presentations | Justice Wecht: Due process forbids hearings that are mere formalities; preliminary hearings must present minimally competent evidence that can be tested through confrontation/cross-examination |
| Whether Verbonitz (and related opinions) permits hearsay-only adjudication at preliminary hearings | Commonwealth: Superior Court treated Verbonitz as permitting hearsay-based bindovers under Rule 542(E) | Ricker: Verbonitz’s controlling and concurring opinions indicate due process forbids bindovers based solely on hearsay | Justice Wecht: Verbonitz (plurality and concurrences) supports the view that due process precludes hearsay-only bindovers |
| Remedy when a preliminary hearing relied essentially on hearsay | Commonwealth: No new hearing required if some non-hearsay evidence was presented | Ricker: If prima facie case was in practice built entirely on hearsay, reversal and a new preliminary hearing are required | Justice Wecht: Reverse Superior Court; Ricker must receive a new preliminary hearing because record shows Trotta’s taped statement was the exclusive basis for the prima facie case |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1970) (preliminary hearing is a critical stage at which right to counsel attaches)
- Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Superior Court decision holding Rule 542(E) allows hearsay to establish elements)
- Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990) (plurality and concurring opinions indicating due process limits on hearsay-only adjudications at preliminary hearings)
- Lovasco v. United States, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (due process protects against procedures that offend fundamental conceptions of justice)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1990) (due process limited to protecting fundamental notions of fairness)
- Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1937) (the hearing must be real, not a sham)
- Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2016) (canon of constitutional avoidance in statutory interpretation)
- Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981) (concurring view that fundamental due process requires adjudications not be based solely on hearsay)