Commonwealth v. Ricker, D., Aplt.
170 A.3d 494
| Pa. | 2017Background
- In June 2014 David Ricker shot PA State Trooper Michael Trotta; Ricker was charged with attempted murder, assault of a law enforcement officer, and aggravated assault.
- At the magisterial district judge (MDJ) preliminary hearing the Commonwealth played a recorded interview of Trooper Trotta (hearsay) and presented live testimony from Trooper Kelley about wounds, recovered firearms, spent casings, and admissions by Ricker observed in the hospital.
- Ricker’s counsel objected to admission of Trotta’s recorded statement without cross-examination and requested a continuance to examine Trotta; the MDJ denied the continuance and bound Ricker over for trial.
- Ricker filed habeas relief arguing (1) the Commonwealth relied solely on hearsay at the preliminary hearing in violation of due process/confrontation rights and (2) Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(E) cannot constitutionally allow a prima facie case to rest entirely on hearsay.
- The trial court and Superior Court found the Commonwealth did not rely exclusively on hearsay; the Superior Court held Rule 542(E) permits hearsay to establish any element, including all elements, of a prima facie case and that no state or federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to preliminary hearings.
- The Supreme Court granted allocatur but dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted; Chief Justice Saylor concurred (case not a suitable vehicle because some direct evidence was presented), Justice Wecht dissented (would have reversed and held hearsay-only prima facie cases unconstitutional).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ricker) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the Commonwealth satisfy the prima facie burden at a preliminary hearing using hearsay alone? | Verbonitz requires legally competent, non-hearsay proof for prima facie; hearsay alone is insufficient and violates due process. | Rule 542(E) permits hearsay and it may be used to establish any or all elements; preliminary hearings are low-safeguard stages. | Appeal dismissed as improvidently granted; majority declined to decide because record contained live, non-hearsay evidence and thus was a poor vehicle to resolve the broad question. |
| Does the state or federal constitutional right to confront witnesses attach at preliminary hearings? | Confrontation and due process principles prohibit binding over based solely on inadmissible hearsay; preliminary hearings are meaningful safeguards where confrontation may attach. | Confrontation is a trial right (Ritchie); Gerstein indicates federal Constitution does not generally require full trial rights at probable-cause/preliminary stages. | Not decided by the Court (division among Justices); Chief Justice Saylor declined to resolve, Justice Wecht would have held due process bars hearsay-only bindovers. |
| How should Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(E) ("Hearsay ... shall be considered") be interpreted as to "any" element? | "Any" should not be read to permit hearsay to establish all elements; ambiguous wording must be construed to avoid constitutional problems. | The rule plainly allows hearsay to establish any element, and courts should defer to rulemaking authority. | Not resolved; concurring opinion urges rulemaking and further advocacy; dissent would construe rule in defendant-favorable way and reverse. |
| Is this case a suitable vehicle to address the above issues? | Ricker: record preserved and the Commonwealth’s prima facie case was essentially Trotta’s tape, so it is suitable. | Commonwealth: MDJ testimony and admissions show case was not hearsay-only; thus not suitable for ruling that hearsay-only is permissible or not. | Majority: case unsuitable — direct evidence existed; declined to reach merits (appeal dismissed as improvidently granted). |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413 (Pa. 1990) (plurality ruling that hearsay alone may be constitutionally insufficient at preliminary hearings)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1975) (distinguishes probable-cause pretrial proceedings from more protective preliminary hearings and limits trial-rights attachment)
- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (U.S. 1987) (Confrontation Clause characterized as a trial right; analyses of rights at pretrial stages)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay absent opportunity for cross-examination)
- Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1970) (preliminary hearing is a critical stage for the right to counsel; counsel’s role at preliminaries explained)
- Ceja (UCBR) v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 493 Pa. 588 (Pa. 1982) (discusses limits of adjudicative reliance on hearsay in administrative contexts)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (distinguishes testimonial vs. nontestimonial documents for confrontation purposes)