Commonwealth v. Reyes, 982 N.E.2d 504

Background

Reyes, a correctional officer with a Class A firearm license, carried his personal firearm in a holster in his vehicle on April 10, 2010 and locked the vehicle at work.
Internal affairs searched Reyes’ vehicle; he disclosed the firearm in the glove box; it was not equipped with a cable lock at that time.
Officers retrieved the firearm from the glove box during the search; it had a loaded magazine but no round in the chamber.
District Court complaints issued April 26, 2010; Reyes moved to dismiss in April 2011; trial occurred April 26, 2011 with guilty verdicts on both charges.
Reyes appealed, challenging vagueness of the storage statute, Second Amendment implications, sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions regarding what constitutes a locked container.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the storage statute unconstitutionally vague?	Reyes argues the term 'secured in a locked container' lacks clear meaning.	Reyes contends vagueness enables arbitrary enforcement and undermines self-defense rights.	Storage statute not impermissibly vague; sufficiently definite with reasonable standards.
Does the storage statute infringe the Second Amendment when applied outside the home?	Runyan-like reasoning suggests potential infringement of self-defense rights.	Storage restrictions outside the home violate the Second Amendment.	Storage statute survives even if Heller applies outside the home; restrictions fall outside core self-defense protection and withstand rational-basis review.
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Reyes under the carrying statute?	Argues firearm remained under Reyes' control while in the vehicle and during travel.	Once the firearm was left in the vehicle, it was stored and not under Reyes' control.	Insufficient evidence; convicted carrying verdict reversed and directed verdict of not guilty on carrying charge.
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Reyes under the storage statute?	Firearm stored in a container within a locked motor vehicle could satisfy storage statute.	Glover box status and whether the container was locked were contested; issue for jury.	Evidence could support storage conviction if container was locked; however, due to deficient jury instructions, storage conviction reversed and remanded for new trial.
Were jury instructions adequate on what qualifies as a 'locked container'?	Judge copied statute language without defining 'locked container'.	Lacked guidance on how to determine adequacy of a locked container.	Jury instruction deficient; not harmless error; remand for new trial with proper guidance on 'locked container'.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368 (Mass. 1978) (due process requires clear penal statutes; defensible with comprehensible standard)
Commonwealth v. Zubiel, 456 Mass. 27 (Mass. 2010) (statutes must define prohibited conduct with sufficient definitiveness)
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114 (Mass. 1993) (penal statutes need not be mathematically precise)
Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732 (Mass. 1977) (statutory meaning may be clarified by normative standard)
Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491 (Mass. 1971) (uncertainty about marginal offenses not fatal if scope is definite)
Commonwealth v. Parzick, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 846 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (secure container standards and access by unauthorized users)
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 316 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (carried vs. under the owner's control interpretation for storage statute)
Commonwealth v. Runyan, 456 Mass. 230 (Mass. 2010) (addressed storage statute and self-defense within home context)