Commonwealth v. Reid, A., Aplt
627 Pa. 78
Pa.2014Background
- In 1991 Anthony “Tone Bey” Reid was convicted of first‑degree murder and related offenses for the 1988 killing of Mark Lisby; he was sentenced to death after the jury found one aggravator (history of violent felonies) and no mitigators.
- Key eyewitnesses included Lawrence Boston (initially testified against Reid at the first trial) and Michael Dozier; at Reid’s second trial Boston invoked the Fifth and his prior testimony was read into the record after being declared unavailable.
- Reid filed a timely PCRA petition with multiple supplements alleging numerous claims: trial/appellate counsel ineffectiveness (failure to investigate and call exculpatory witnesses, failure to impeach Dozier, failure to seek Kloiber and other jury instructions, inadequate mitigation investigation), conflict of interest, Batson, Brady/discovery failures, and errors in admission of evidence and jury instructions.
- The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice and ultimately dismissed the petition; the Commonwealth at one point agreed to a limited evidentiary hearing but Reid’s counsel repeatedly sought continuances and other conditions and a hearing did not proceed.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the PCRA court’s denial de novo for legal error and record support, applied Strickland/Pierce standards for ineffectiveness, and affirmed the PCRA dismissal as to all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Reid’s Argument | Commonwealth/PCRA Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance — failure to investigate/call alleged exculpatory witnesses | Counsel failed to locate or call several witnesses whose sworn declarations would exonerate Reid | Many proffers were hearsay, unsworn, lacked PCRA sworn‑witness certifications, no showing witness availability or cooperation, cumulative of trial evidence | Denied — procedurally and substantively deficient; no prejudice shown |
| Conflict of interest re: Seay cross‑examining Boston at first trial | Seay allegedly represented Boston and therefore could not fully cross‑examine him; second‑trial counsel should have raised conflict | No evidence Seay represented Boston in the case contemporaneously; Seay extensively cross‑examined Boston; no actual conflict or prejudice | Denied — no actual conflict; trial record shows robust cross‑examination |
| Impeachment of Dozier (dismissed charges & favorable treatment) / Brady | Dozier had dismissed/compromised charges and received benefits; counsel failed to impeach and prosecution withheld Brady material | Record showed no open charges at trial; allegations of benefits were speculative, unsupported; discovery requests were fishing expeditions | Denied — claim speculative, unsupported; even if true, impeachment was cumulative and not prejudicial |
| Kloiber instruction (eyewitness ID reliability) | Counsel should have requested a Kloiber charge because witnesses made inconsistent pretrial IDs | Dozier and Boston knew Reid, observed him closely, later explained pretrial non‑IDs were from fear of JBM reprisals; ability to identify was not at issue | Denied — Kloiber not implicated; no prejudice; no remand required for credibility hearing |
| Batson claim / jury selection discrimination | Prosecutor used peremptories disproportionately against Black venirepersons; PCRA discovery and hearing were denied | Reid failed to preserve record at trial (no Batson challenge), proffer incomplete; alleged office‑wide evidence (Baldus, McMahon tape) insufficient to show purposeful discrimination; Reid obstructed offered hearings | Denied — insufficient record and proof of purposeful discrimination; PCRA did not abuse discretion in denying relief |
| Ineffective assistance at sentencing — mitigation investigation | Counsel failed to investigate family, school, foster‑care, and mental‑health mitigation and failed to present religious conversion evidence | Many mitigation claims were raised in unauthorized supplemental filings or were cumulative of presented mitigation; Reid’s counsel repeatedly delayed evidentiary hearings; exclusion of specific religious label did not prejudice | Denied — claims waived or unproven; no prejudice shown given aggravator and the mitigation actually presented |
| Admission of Boston’s prior testimony (Fifth Amendment waiver) | Once witness waives Fifth at one proceeding, he cannot raise it at another where no new self‑incriminating testimony would be required | Pennsylvania law does not treat prior waiver as binding in later independent proceedings; Boston’s prior testimony remained incriminating and risked prosecution | Denied — Boston was properly declared unavailable and prior testimony admissible |
| Admission of hearsay in proving aggravator (detective testimony) | Prosecutor used detectives’ recounting of other trials/ME reports to prove prior convictions — hearsay and Confrontation problem | Detectives had first‑hand knowledge (investigations, presence at trials); official court records were produced; trial testimony was limited; no improper reliance on inadmissible hearsay shown | Denied — detectives competent for limited testimony; no Confrontation violation established |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (performance and prejudice standard for ineffective assistance) (establishes two‑prong test)
- Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186 (Penn. 2001) (adopts Strickland framework for PCRA claims)
- Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167 (Pa. 1994) (direct‑appeal opinion recited trial record and admission of gang evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 (Pa. 2002) (procedural rule on raising ineffectiveness claims and counsel changes)
- Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 (Pa. 2003) (layering of ineffectiveness claims)
- Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412 (Pa. 1954) (special instruction for weak or equivocal identifications)
- Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240 (Pa. 2009) (inadmissibility of hearsay as basis for relief)
- Commonwealth v. Carson, 559 Pa. 460 (Pa. 1999) (requirements for failure‑to‑call witness claims)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (peremptory strikes may not be race‑based)
- Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 (Pa. 2009) (limitations on using office‑wide studies/tapes to prove purposeful discrimination)
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (juror instruction on parole ineligibility where future dangerousness is at issue) (not retroactive to Reynolds' trial date)