Commonwealth v. Ray
467 Mass. 115
| Mass. | 2014Background
- On June 10, 2004, during longstanding hostilities between two youth groups in Roxbury, a 14‑year‑old (Da-keem Galloway) was shot and killed; defendant Ray (16 at the time) was later indicted and convicted of first‑degree murder after a jury trial.
- Multiple eyewitnesses gave varying accounts; some identified Ray (or described clothing matching him), others initially denied seeing the shooter; grand jury testimony from witnesses (including Kyrice Grady) was read at trial where live testimony was inconsistent.
- Police recovered .25 caliber casings and a scooter near the scene; the defendant made two police statements (June 11 and July 12); only the July 12 statements were challenged on appeal.
- Pretrial, a protective order limited counsel’s sharing of unredacted discovery because of witness‑intimidation concerns; at trial the judge required a sign‑in/photo‑ID procedure for courtroom entry.
- Post‑conviction issues raised included: courtroom closures during jury selection and sign‑in procedure, alleged ineffective assistance for failure to investigate a potential eyewitness, denial of a continuance, admissibility of July 12 statements (Miranda/voluntariness), limits on cross‑examination/hearsay, a sleeping juror, and constitutional challenge to life‑without‑parole sentencing for a juvenile in light of Miller/Diatchenko.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Ray's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Closure of courtroom for jury selection | Closure was agreed to by counsel and not improper | Full public‑trial right violated by excluding public during empanelment | Waiver: counsel acquiesced; no reversible error (right waived) |
| Sign‑in/photo‑ID entry requirement during trial | Safety measure in presence of articulable witness‑intimidation risk; minimal intrusion | Procedure amounted to unconstitutional partial closure | Not a constitutional closure; satisfied Maldonado framework and was narrowly tailored |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to investigate Karl Chester (witness) | Counsel pursued investigation, used private investigator; no prejudice shown | Counsel failed to interview potentially exculpatory witness, prejudicing defense | No Saferian ineffective assistance: counsel’s conduct not below standard and defendant failed to show prejudice |
| Denial of continuance to permit more preparation under protective order | Delay would not materially aid resolution; counsel had prior opportunities; judge offered short suspensions if needed | Protective order hindered counsel’s preparation and warranted continuance | No abuse of discretion; judge balanced interests and later lifted protective order; no measurable detriment |
| Suppression of July 12 statements (Miranda/voluntariness) | Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda; statements voluntary | Juvenile lacked genuine opportunity to consult adult; waiver invalid; statements involuntary | Admission upheld: although no genuine consultation, alternative showing satisfied (prior Miranda waiver, experience, proximity to 17th birthday); statements voluntary |
| Limits on cross‑examination/hearsay re: Grady/Galloway | Judge properly managed hearsay concerns; admissible limited for impeachment | Exclusion of substance of out‑of‑court statement impaired impeachment and substantive use | No abuse of discretion; judge allowed a limiting impeachment route and jury instruction; no miscarriage of justice |
| Sleeping juror | Voir dire and judge’s inquiry adequate; juror could deliberate fairly | Juror’s repeated sleeping deprived defendant of impartial jury | Judge did not abuse discretion; juror permitted to deliberate after questioning |
| Juvenile life without parole sentence (Eighth Amendment / state constitutional) | Sentence imposed under then‑existing statute | Mandatory/no‑parole sentence for juvenile cruel and unusual | Conviction affirmed but sentence vacated/remanded for resentencing under Diatchenko (Miller applied); juvenile made eligible for parole under G. L. c. 127 §133A |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (interpreting Miller and holding juvenile life without parole unconstitutional under art. 26; remedial resentencing required)
- Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742 (2013) (framework for evaluating courtroom‑entry conditions like sign‑in/ID requirements)
- Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (public‑trial right applies to jury selection)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance review)
- Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55 (1984) (standards for admitting grand jury testimony)