82 N.E.3d 403
Mass.2017Background
- In 1987 two people (Schlosser and Buchannan) were bound with duct tape and shot dead in a Westwood home; no eyewitnesses or murder weapon found and no physical linkage to defendants.
- James P. Ridge later told acquaintances he and others entered the house to rob it, bound the victims, and he shot them when one recognized him; Ridge was convicted earlier; Patricia Rakes pleaded to manslaughter; defendant James M. Rakes tried separately and convicted in 2005 as a joint venturer of two counts of first‑degree murder (felony‑murder, deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity/cruelty).
- Key inculpatory evidence: (1) Ridge’s out‑of‑court statements to Trundley and others describing the robbery and implicating Rakes; (2) a 1992 report that Rakes told his then girlfriend he had killed two people; (3) jailhouse statements in 2002 by Ridge and by Rakes to a fellow inmate referencing each other.
- Pretrial challenges included motions to dismiss indictments for insufficient grand jury evidence and for alleged grand jury impairment (withheld exculpatory information, improper prior‑bad‑acts references, and comment on invocation of silence); trial objections included hearsay, prior‑incarceration records, courtroom closure during empanelment, prosecutor misconduct in closing, and the reasonable‑doubt instruction.
- The trial and posttrial motions were denied; the SJC affirmed the convictions and denial of a new trial and declined relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Rakes's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of grand jury evidence to indict | Hearsay statements (Karos, Trundley, Bergin) provided probable cause linking Rakes to joint venture | Evidence was only hearsay and insufficient to establish probable cause | Grand jury evidence (even if hearsay) was sufficient; indictment not dismissed |
| Grand jury integrity — withheld exculpatory evidence | No withheld material that would have distorted proceedings or materially undermined witnesses | Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory info (Bergin’s drug history; FBI Agent Connolly’s indictments) | Withheld items were not so material as to require dismissal; no impairment |
| Admission of coventurer (Ridge) statements | Ridge’s statements admissible under joint‑venture exception (made during/ in furtherance or to conceal the crime) | Statements were hearsay, too remote in time or not in furtherance of any joint venture | Trial judge properly admitted those statements after finding independent evidence of a joint venture; statements also admissible as intent/concealment evidence |
| Sufficiency of trial evidence to sustain three theories of first‑degree murder | Circumstantial evidence and admitted statements established joint venture, knowledge of armed coventurer, shared intent to kill, and cruelty factors | Evidence was circumstantial and speculative; insufficient to prove joint venturer liability or specific intent to kill | Viewing evidence favorably to Commonwealth, a rational jury could find felony‑murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity/cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of grand jury evidence)
- Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 (probable cause standard for indictments)
- Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445 (grand jury exculpatory‑evidence rule)
- Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372 (indictments may be based solely on hearsay)
- Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421 (joint‑venturer hearsay exception — prerequisites and procedure)
- Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517 (continuing concealment can keep joint‑venture exception applicable over time)
- Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (formulation of joint‑venture standard and intent requirement)
- Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence at trial)
- Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396 (deliberate premeditation elements)
- Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216 (factors supporting extreme atrocity or cruelty)
