Commonwealth v. Presher
179 A.3d 90
Pa. Super. Ct.2018Background
- Michael Presher was charged by criminal complaint and proceeded by summons for theft-related offenses; he missed a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over.
- A jury acquitted Presher of all charges at a one-day trial on December 7, 2016.
- On December 9, 2016, the trial court, at the Commonwealth’s request, ordered Presher to be processed and fingerprinted under 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112(b)(2) (mandatory fingerprinting for defendants proceeded against by summons).
- Presher filed a motion for reconsideration objecting to post-acquittal fingerprinting; the court denied the motion and Presher appealed.
- The Superior Court reviewed whether § 9112(b)(2) authorizes fingerprinting of persons after acquittal and whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering fingerprinting post-acquittal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 9112(b)(2) authorizes post-acquittal fingerprinting | Commonwealth urged enforcement of the court order and suggested expungement was available if relief was desired | Presher argued the statute does not apply after acquittal; he is no longer a "defendant" | The court held § 9112(b)(2) does not apply to fully acquitted persons; trial court abused its discretion |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering fingerprinting after acquittal | Commonwealth supported the order as proper procedure | Presher contended ordering was an abuse because the statute’s term "defendant" no longer fit post-acquittal status | Held abuse of discretion because the statute’s language contemplates persons still defendants in pending proceedings |
| Whether statutory construction should avoid constitutional questions (e.g., Due Process, Equal Protection, Fourth, Eighth Amendment claims) | Commonwealth suggested remedies like expungement rather than invalidating the statute | Presher raised constitutional challenges to post-acquittal fingerprinting | Court avoided constitutional analysis by construing the statute as not applying post-acquittal, mooting constitutional claims |
| Whether the term "defendant" in § 9112(b)(2) includes acquitted persons | Commonwealth implied practical application could reach post-acquittal absent expungement | Presher argued plain meaning excludes acquitted individuals | Held "defendant" refers to persons still subject to the criminal process; acquittal ends that status, so statute doesn’t apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 620 A.2d 1213 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Commonwealth v. Berryman, 649 A.2d 961 (read statute by plain meaning and in context)
- DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (presumption of constitutionality and burden on challenger)
- Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (duty to avoid constitutional difficulties by construing statutes narrowly)
- In re D.M., 695 A.2d 770 (acquittal is strongest vindication; supports expungement/ protection post-acquittal)
- Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137 (abuse of discretion standard)