200 A.3d 1015
Pa. Super. Ct.2018Background
- Appellant Frederick Postie was convicted by a jury (Oct. 2013) of multiple conspiracies, burglaries, theft-related offenses involving removal and sale of copper/wires from vacant properties; two accomplices (Keck, Frank) testified for the Commonwealth after plea deals.
- A police officer read portions of Appellant’s handwritten statement at trial; a dispute arose over whether a line read “me” (implicating Appellant) or “one” (less incriminating). The parties agreed to redact non‑relevant portions and the trial court allowed the redacted statement to go out with the jury during deliberations.
- Appellant testified and denied participating in the burglaries, admitting only limited post‑event assistance (help unloading at a scrap yard). The jury convicted; sentence imposed (aggregate 40–132 months). The Superior Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition alleging (inter alia) trial court error for not holding a hearing on his request to proceed pro se at trial, ineffective assistance for failing to obtain a limiting instruction for accomplice testimony, and ineffective assistance for agreeing to send his written statement to the jury (arguing a Rule 646 violation). PCRA counsel initially abandoned the case; after en banc proceedings Postie proceeded pro se on the PCRA appeal.
- The PCRA court denied relief without a hearing. The Superior Court (en banc) affirmed, applying the Strickland three‑prong ineffective assistance test, concluding Appellant’s claims lacked arguable merit or counsel had a reasonable basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Postie) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/PCRA court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Trial court duty to hold colloquy on request to proceed pro se at trial / counsel ineffective for not forcing hearing | Postie says he made an unequivocal request to proceed pro se pretrial and counsel failed to secure a colloquy; counsel was ineffective for not advocating for self‑representation, prejudicing his defense | Record shows Postie initially sought to proceed pro se but then told the court “Currently, no.” Counsel filed to withdraw when request was made; request was not timely and unequivocal | Denied — claim previously litigated on direct appeal; ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit because request was not clear and unequivocal and counsel had reasonable basis |
| 2) Failure to give limiting instruction that one accomplice cannot corroborate another; counsel ineffective for not requesting it | Postie contends the jury should have been explicitly instructed that accomplice testimony cannot corroborate another accomplice, and counsel’s failure to request/object was ineffective | Trial court gave an accomplice instruction advising caution and requiring corroboration by independent evidence; suggested‑instruction wording not mandatory and the charge as given was legally adequate | Denied — instruction as a whole was accurate; no reversible error and counsel not ineffective |
| 3) Allowing defendant’s written statement to go out with jury (Rule 646) — per se ineffectiveness / automatic new trial | Postie argues Rule 646 forbids a copy of a defendant’s confession during deliberations; permitting it (and counsel not objecting) is per se prejudicial requiring reversal | Court found the statement arguably exculpatory, redacted, and integral to defense strategy; counsel had a reasonable strategic basis to let jurors review it; per se rule (as in Young) not binding and is overruled here | Denied — no per se ineffectiveness; counsel had reasonable basis under Strickland; prejudice not presumed |
| 4) PCRA counsel abandonment and need for remand for new counsel to file amended petition | Postie argued original PCRA counsel abandoned him and failed to file amended petition or Turner/Finley withdrawal | Record shows counsel did abandon earlier, but Postie repeatedly elected to proceed pro se after en banc remand; subsequent counsel withdrew and Postie opted to proceed pro se on appeal | Denied/remand unnecessary — because Postie elected to proceed pro se after appointment of new counsel, court treated pro se status as resolved |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel requiring deficient performance and prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111 (Pa. 2011) (counsel’s strategic choices upheld unless alternative offered substantially greater chance of success)
- Commonwealth v. Penrose, 669 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. 1995) (trial counsel permitted defendant’s written statement to go out with jury; counsel’s strategic rationale can defeat ineffectiveness claim)
- Commonwealth v. Young, 767 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2001) (held sending written confession to jury requires vacation of judgment; Court treated such violations as inherently prejudicial — court here declines to follow as per se rule)
- Commonwealth v. Karaffa, 709 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1998) (jury possession of written jury instructions during deliberations deemed per se reversible error)
- Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821 (Pa. 2014) (Suggested Standard Jury Instructions are nonbinding guides; trial courts have broad discretion in phrasing charges)
- Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822 (Pa. 2005) (prejudice is presumed only in rare, limited circumstances)