Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23

Background

Defendant convicted by jury in Superior Court on two indictments for statutory rape involving his fifteen-year-old niece Molly.
Molly disclosed abuse after a school meeting; visit to Massachusetts in Aug. 2007 with adoptive family.
Molly’s interview at a center and medical exam followed disclosure; physical exam was normal.
Trial testimony described two nights of alleged acts by the defendant; subsequent inconsistencies emerged in Molly’s accounts.
Defense theories: (a) Molly fabricated for attention; (b) dissociative memory/dissociation affecting memory; sought to admit Dr. Brown’s testimony and related evidence.
Judge excluded Dr. Brown’s testimony and most prior-abuse evidence, allowed limited testimony on inconsistent memory as a prior statement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exclusion of Dr. Brown’s dissociative-memory testimony was error.	Gants argues it supported the defense’s theory of confabulation.	Gants contends the testimony could reveal memory distortion and fracture credibility.	Abuse of discretion; exclusion prejudicial; reversal required.
Whether evidence of Molly’s past sexual abuse was admissible notwithstanding rape-shield statute.	Commonwealth contends shielding evidence is appropriate.	Defendant contends constitutionally required to admit to test credibility.	Constitutional right to present evidence outweighed rape shield, error not harmless.
Whether the trial court’s handling of Molly’s prior inconsistent statements violated defendant’s rights.	Defense theory hinges on inconsistencies being probative of memory problems.	Argument that prior statements show confabulation and dissociation.	Court allowed limited use; error in denying broader context for credibility analysis.
Whether closing argument misstated or biased the jury regarding Molly’s credibility.	Prosecutor asked motive to lie, tying credibility to truthfulness.	Defense argued credibility contested; prosecutor’s line overstepped Beaudry limits.	Closing argument permissible when addressing credibility, but contextual limits apply.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752 (Mass. 2010) (admissibility of expert dissociative-memory testimony to aid credibility assessment)
Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811 (Mass. 1987) (constitutional dimension of presenting witness credibility evidence)
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222 (Mass. 1981) (cross-examining victim to show bias or fabrication; limits on credibility arguments)
Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577 (Mass. 2005) (prosecutor may question victim credibility but not sole basis for credibility finding)
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (Mass. 1994) (gatekeeping for expert testimony in psychological disorder cases)
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180 (Mass. 1996) (limits on expert testimony about witness credibility; non-vouching rule)
Commonwealth v. Williams (Shanley companion cite), 455 Mass. 752 (Mass. 2010) (see Shanley for recovered-memory testimony framework)
Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618 (Mass. 1989) (admissibility of behavioral/psychological testimony in abuse cases)
Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527 (Mass. 2001) (recognition of expert testimony about dissociative symptoms in sexual-abuse cases)
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 Mass. 441 (Mass. 2003) (admissibility of victim’s out-of-court statements to show fear and implications for credibility)
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390 (Mass. 2004) (expert testimony allowed on disorder symptoms when relevant to case)
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87 (Mass. 1973) (Rodriguez sentencing/appellate guidance on limiting instructions)
Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 435 Mass. 183 (Mass. 2001) (evidence of mental-health records to assess credibility and memory)
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222 (Mass. 1981) (rapes; limits on character evidence)