192 A.3d 1123
Pa.2018Background
- Peterson pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in 1993 and received consecutive life sentences.
- The 1995 PCRA amendments imposed a one-year filing bar for post-conviction petitions; because Peterson’s judgment became final before the amendments, his timely deadline was January 16, 1997.
- Private counsel filed Peterson’s first PCRA petition on January 17, 1997—one day late—and the petition thereafter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing years later; the PCRA court denied relief on the merits (March 4, 2014).
- Peterson appealed; the Superior Court quashed the appeal as untimely because the underlying first PCRA petition had been filed one day late.
- Peterson filed a second PCRA petition arguing that counsel’s late filing constituted ineffectiveness per se that prevented meaningful collateral review; the PCRA court found factual support and held the second petition timely under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, holding that counsel’s negligence in filing an untimely PCRA petition can be ineffectiveness per se that satisfies § 9545(b)(1)(ii) when it wholly deprives a petitioner of any appellate or collateral-review opportunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Peterson) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 9545(b)(1)(ii) permits a second PCRA petition when prior counsel’s lateness wholly deprived appellate review | Counsel’s one-day late filing was a newly discovered fact of ineffectiveness per se that Peterson could not have discovered with due diligence; thus § 9545(b)(1)(ii) applies | “Abandonment” occurs only when counsel severs the attorney-client relationship; mere negligence (missing a deadline) does not trigger the exception and petitioners are bound by counsel’s actions | Held for Peterson: counsel’s untimely filing that completely forecloses review constitutes ineffectiveness per se and may satisfy § 9545(b)(1)(ii) if petitioner did not and could not have discovered the failure with due diligence |
| Whether Bennett’s distinction between partial and complete deprivation of review applies | Bennett supports extending § 9545(b)(1)(ii) to any attorney error that completely deprives review, not only literal abandonment | Distinguishes Bennett as involving abandonment and warns against eroding the PCRA time bar by equitable exceptions | Court: Bennett controls — the key is whether counsel’s error wholly foreclosed review; abandonment is one form but not the only form of ineffectiveness per se |
| Whether counsel’s action vs. inaction matters for per se relief | Action (filing a late petition or filing a brief raising no preserved issues) can be functionally equivalent to inaction when it wholly forecloses review | Commonwealth argues the difference matters and that active filings bind petitioner | Court rejected a meaningful action/inaction distinction (citing Rosado) — functional result (complete loss of review) controls |
| Whether petitioner satisfied the statutory diligence and timing requirements for § 9545(b)(1)(ii) | Peterson did not know and could not have ascertained the missed deadline until the Superior Court’s decision; he filed within 60 days of discovery | Commonwealth disputed invocation of the exception | PCRA court’s factual findings accepted: Peterson proved the facts were unknown and filed within 60 days; exception applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (distinguishes partial vs. complete deprivation of appellate review and allows § 9545(b)(1)(ii) where counsel’s error wholly deprives review)
- Commonwealth v. Rosado, 637 Pa. 424, 150 A.3d 425 (Pa. 2016) (counsel’s filing of a brief raising only waived issues is functionally equivalent to failing to file a brief and can constitute ineffectiveness per se)
- Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005) (failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement waived issues and constituted complete deprivation of direct appeal)
- Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal despite defendant’s request deprived the defendant of appellate review)
- Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) (discusses limits on invoking counsel’s appellate choices as newly discovered facts when counsel merely narrowed issues)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 557 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (jurisdictional time limits are mandatory; courts lack authority to create ad hoc equitable exceptions to statutory time bars)