Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163

On May 12, 2014, police stopped a Chevrolet Cruze that had been stopped at a red light adjacent to Ceylon Park; while stopped the vehicle was within 100 feet of the park.
The defendant was the front-seat passenger; after the stop the car was pulled further away and the vehicle was no longer within 100 feet of the park.
An officer observed the defendant discard a clear plastic bag; the bag later was found to contain individually wrapped amounts of suspected crack cocaine and pills; a loaded handgun was found in a passenger bag during an inventory search.
Defendant was charged with (among other offenses) possession with intent to distribute and a park-zone offense under G. L. c. 94C, § 32J (drug offense within 100 feet of a public park).
Defendant moved to dismiss the park-zone charge as unconstitutional as applied/overbroad because his presence within the 100-foot zone was fortuitous—he was merely a passenger whose vehicle stopped at a red light.
The trial judge granted the motion; the Commonwealth appealed to the SJC, which affirmed dismissal limited to these facts and the predicate offense of possession with intent to distribute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether G. L. c. 94C, § 32J applies to a passenger momentarily within 100 feet of a park because a vehicle stopped at a red light	§ 32J is strict liability as written; literal reading covers anyone physically within 100 feet, regardless of reason or time	Applying § 32J here would be unfair and beyond legislative intent; the defendant's presence was fortuitous and posed no risk to children	Court held § 32J should not be applied to these facts; dismissing the park-zone charge as overreaching (limited to this circumstance)

Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224 (Mass. 1992) (upheld § 32J despite removal of knowledge element but cautioned against extraordinary circumstances)
Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647 (Mass. 1992) (explaining lack of required knowledge of school boundaries under § 32J)
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551 (Mass. 2013) (discussing legislative purpose and later amendments narrowing zone and time window)
United States v. Coates, 739 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (federal dismissal where defendants’ proximity to school was fortuitous)
State v. Barnes, 275 Kan. 364 (Kan. 2003) (refusing to stretch school-zone statute to fortuitous proximity)