Commonwealth v. Perkins
981 N.E.2d 630
Mass.2013Background
- Cordell McAfee was murdered on May 7, 2010; the defendant was charged December 20, 2010 by a District Court complaint for murder in the first degree and unlawful carrying of a firearm; he was arraigned January 21, 2011 in the Dorchester District Court.
- A probable cause hearing was scheduled for February 17, 2011, but the prosecutor requested continuances to March 16 and then April 15, 2011 for additional time to obtain DNA evidence.
- The defendant opposed continuances and moved to dismiss on March 16, 2011, but the judge denied the motion.
- On March 24, 2011 the defendant petitioned under G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking an order that a probable cause hearing be held as soon as possible and not later than April 15, 2011; the district court proceedings continued.
- A grand jury indicted the defendant for murder in the first degree on May 7, 2011; the district court probable cause hearing never occurred and the petition under § 3 was decided in the defendant’s favor only to the extent moot.
- The single justice denied the requested relief by memorandum, and the defendant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 38 applies to a defendant charged by complaint with murder in the first degree. | Commonwealth contends § 38 does not apply to capital cases charged by complaint. | McAfee argued § 38 protects timely probable cause proceedings for such defendants. | § 38 applies to defendants charged with murder in the first degree. |
| What is the proper timing of the probable cause hearing under § 38 when indictment by grand jury is involved? | Commonwealth argues no fixed timeframe; timing tied to grand jury proceedings. | Defendant urged a strict short timeframe (e.g., 30 days) for promptness. | ‘As soon as may be’ means reasonably practicable given circumstances, including indictment requirements; not a fixed 30-day rule. |
| How should continuances of the probable cause hearing be evaluated? | Continuances justified by ongoing grand jury investigation and need to marshal evidence. | Continuances without good cause violate the hearing’s purpose and the defendant’s liberty interest. | Judge must require good cause for any continuance; ongoing grand jury activity is a factor but not sufficient alone; no automatic extension beyond thirty days if in custody. |
| What is the proper standard of proof at the probable cause hearing under § 38? | Directed verdict standard appropriate to determine probable cause to send to trial. | Standard should be reconsidered to avoid the punitive effect of delaying screening. | Court reiterates Myers directed-verdict standard but acknowledges need to reevaluate in an appropriate case; currently applies as described. |
| Should the Commonwealth be barred from raising § 4A arguments on appeal? | Commonwealth did not present § 4A to the single justice at the outset. | Public importance warrants addressing the merits of § 4A in light of the case's context. | Court declines strict waiver and addresses the merits of the Commonwealth’s § 4A argument. |
Key Cases Cited
- Corey v. Commonwealth, 364 Mass. 137 (Mass. 1973) (probable cause hearing applies to charges beyond court's jurisdiction)
- Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843 (Mass. 1973) (probable cause standard requires more than arrest probable cause; directed-verdict standard)
- Lataille v. District Court of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525 (Mass. 1974) (grand jury as investigating body; prob. hearings differ when indictment is returned)
- Daye, 435 Mass. 463 (Mass. 2001) (interpretation of statute's timing and purpose; prior interpretations applied)
- Fisher v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 340 (Mass. 2001) (application of § 38 to capital cases; waiver considerations)