Commonwealth v. Perfetto
169 A.3d 1114
Pa. Super. Ct.2017Background
- In July 2014 in Philadelphia, Marc Perfetto was charged with three DUIs (misdemeanors/indictable) and a summary traffic offense (driving without lights). The summary was tried first in Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division; conviction followed. DUI charges proceeded later in Municipal Court General Division and Court of Common Pleas.
- Perfetto moved to dismiss the subsequent DUI prosecution under Pennsylvania’s compulsory-joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(l)(ii), arguing the offenses arose from the same criminal episode, were known to the prosecutor, and occurred in the same judicial district. The trial court granted dismissal.
- The Commonwealth appealed; the Superior Court granted en banc review to address the effect of the 2002 amendment to § 110 that replaced "within the jurisdiction of a single court" with "occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution."
- The Superior Court majority reversed the trial court, holding that in judicial districts with a separate traffic court (like Philadelphia), summary Title 75 offenses may be disposed in the traffic court without triggering § 110’s bar to later prosecution of higher offenses arising from the same episode.
- The court explained that although § 110 now asks whether offenses occurred in the same judicial district, jurisdictional structure (and statutory provisions assigning exclusive traffic jurisdiction in some districts) remains relevant; Section 1302 and related rules assign summary traffic matters to Philadelphia’s Traffic Division.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Perfetto) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 110(l)(ii) barred later DUI prosecution after prior summary conviction for same episode | Pre-amendment precedent and § 110 require dismissal because offenses occurred in same judicial district and were known to prosecutor | Prior summary conviction for the Title 75 offense bars later DUI prosecution under compulsory joinder | Reversed: DUI prosecution not barred given Philadelphia’s traffic-court structure; summary traffic matters may be disposed in Traffic Division without invoking § 110 bar |
| Meaning of "same judicial district" (2002 amendment) | Amendment should not upend longstanding joinder practice based on court jurisdiction | Amendment requires inquiry into judicial-district occurrence; joinder applies if offenses occurred in same district and prosecutor knew | Held that phrase is clear: focus is on occurrence within same judicial district; but jurisdictional organization can create exceptions |
| Role of court jurisdiction / § 112(1) exception (former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction) | § 112 does not permit separate prosecutions where courts in district have proper jurisdiction over both offenses | (Concurring view) § 112(1) permits subsequent prosecution because the Traffic Division lacked jurisdiction to try DUIs | Majority rejects broad § 112(1) defense here, relying instead on statutory assignment (Section 1302/municipal rules) to justify separate disposition; concurrence would resolve via § 112(1) as permitting reprosecution |
| Effect of Philadelphia Municipal Court restructuring on joinder | Structuring does not defeat § 110—Municipal Court could have tried all charges together | Traffic Division (or Traffic Court predecessor) has exclusive authority over Title 75 summaries, so prior disposition there does not bar later prosecution of more serious charges | Held that Philadelphia’s statutory/regulatory scheme assigns summary traffic matters to Traffic Division such that prior summary disposition in Traffic Division does not bar subsequent prosecution of felony/misdemeanor charges arising from the same episode |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973) (establishes compulsory joinder principle requiring prosecution of all known charges from the same criminal episode in one proceeding)
- Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1995) (articulates four‑prong compulsory-joinder test)
- Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66 (Pa. 2008) (interprets the 2002 amendment and defines “judicial district” as the county area for purposes of § 110)
- Commonwealth v. Geyer, 687 A.2d 815 (Pa. 1996) (clarifies that summary offenses are subject to § 110 when multiple summary offenses are within a single court)
- Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579 (Pa. Super. 2013) (applies the updated fourth prong language — that charges be within the same judicial district)