Commonwealth v. Perez
97 A.3d 747
Pa. Super. Ct.2014Background
- Appellant Miguel Angel Perez pled nolo contendere to one count of indecent assault (first-degree misdemeanor) as part of a plea agreement; sentence: 9–23 months imprisonment plus 2 years probation.
- At sentencing the trial court ordered Perez to register under Pennsylvania’s SORNA for 25 years (Tier II classification).
- Perez moved to declare 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14 unconstitutional as applied (retroactive application), arguing Ex Post Facto violations under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions; the trial court denied the motion.
- On appeal Perez argued that retroactive application of the 25-year registration (rather than the prior 10-year term) increased punishment in violation of Ex Post Facto Clauses.
- The Superior Court applied the two-step Smith v. Doe framework (legislative intent then Mendoza‑Martinez/Kennedy factors) and balanced the seven Kennedy factors to assess whether SORNA’s effects are punitive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Perez) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive application of SORNA’s 25‑year registration violates the federal Ex Post Facto Clause | Retroactive imposition of longer, mandatory in‑person registration and related burdens is punitive and increases punishment | Legislature declared SORNA civil/regulatory; most Mendoza‑Martinez factors weigh against punitive characterization; one burdensome feature (in‑person reporting) is insufficient | No Ex Post Facto violation; retroactive application constitutional |
| Whether SORNA’s mandatory in‑person reporting transforms the statute into punishment | In‑person verification (multiple required visits) is an affirmative restraint comparable to probation/supervision | Restraint is relatively minor and collateral; other factors (historical treatment, scienter, rational regulatory purpose) weigh against punitive label | In‑person requirement counts toward punitive effects but not dispositive; overall non‑punitive |
| Whether SORNA’s public dissemination and duration are excessive or retributive | Worldwide internet dissemination, longer tiers, and inability to terminate registration make statute excessive/retributive | Registration is rationally related to public safety and recidivism risk; categorical rules are permissible without individualized risk findings | Duration and dissemination do not render statute punitive under federal Ex Post Facto analysis |
| Whether Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than federal standard | (Argued inadequately below; no Edmunds analysis) | State precedent treats state and federal Ex Post Facto analyses as comparable; petitioner failed required state‑constitutional analysis | State claim fails; no independent state‑level relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (framework for civil vs. punitive sex‑offender registration; high "clearest proof" threshold)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (seven‑factor test for determining punitive effect)
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (historical Ex Post Facto categories)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (guidance on ex post facto inquiry)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (sufficient risk test for ex post facto analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (Pennsylvania discussion of registration effects and collateral disabilities)
- Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 557 Pa. 327, 733 A.2d 616 (state precedent treating registration statutes as non‑punitive)
- Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254 (Pa. Super. precedent cited on review standard and SORNA application)