44 N.E.3d 886
Mass. App. Ct.2016Background
- Defendant Gloria Perez, a bank customer service representative, was indicted on 26 property-related counts after internal bank review; a jury convicted her of six counts (two larcenies over $250 including one against a person 60+, two for forgery, two for uttering).
- Key transactions involved elderly customer Phyllis Wall: two withdrawals (June 5, 2006 for $1,000; July 21, 2006 for $300) bearing signatures alleged to be forged and the defendant’s initials with an "ID only" annotation; defendant deposited cash into other accounts soon after at least one withdrawal.
- Another conviction involved multiple withdrawals from Hector Rodriguez’s account; Rodriguez testified he never received the cash and that Perez had frequent access to his records.
- Bank fraud investigator Thomas Backstrom testified about the bank’s record-keeping, authenticated transaction slips and computer-generated entries, and recounted the defendant’s admissions during an August 2, 2006 interview (including admitting she signed Wall’s withdrawal slip for $300).
- At trial the Commonwealth introduced various bank documents (some compound and some computer-generated); defense argued admission violated hearsay/business-records rules, the bank-records affidavit statute (G. L. c. 233, § 77), and the Confrontation Clause; defendant also argued insufficiency of larceny intent as to Wall.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Perez's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether bank documents admitted violated hearsay or Confrontation Clause | Documents were non-hearsay verbal acts or machine-generated entries; not offered for truth of out-of-court assertions | Documents contained out-of-court statements and so were hearsay triggering Confrontation concerns | Admission did not raise hearsay/Confrontation problems because contested items were operative verbal acts or computer-generated data, not hearsay statements |
| Whether contested documents had proper authentication (incl. business-records exception, G. L. c. 233, § 78) | Backstrom’s testimony about bank systems and document circumstances sufficiently authenticated records; some items admitted for non-hearsay purposes | Lack of keeper-affidavit and some records allegedly forged undermined § 78/business-records authentication | Authentication was adequate via Backstrom’s testimony; allegedly forged items could still be admitted for non-hearsay purposes |
| Whether admission without a § 77 keeper-of-records affidavit violated § 77 | § 77 is not the exclusive means to admit bank copies; live-witness authentication suffices | Absence of required § 77 affidavit rendered copies incompetent under the statute | § 77 does not preclude other authentication methods; no § 77 violation and no miscarriage of justice shown |
| Sufficiency of evidence on intent to permanently deprive (larceny) as to Wall | Circumstantial evidence (forged signature, lies to investigator, quick deposit of $200 into defendant’s account) supports intent to steal | Wall’s death meant no direct testimony she didn’t receive money; defendant claimed she delivered funds to Wall, undermining intent element | Viewed in light most favorable to prosecution, evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find intent to permanently deprive |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535 (2011) (defining hearsay and business-records requirements)
- Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442 (2011) (operative words/verbal acts are not hearsay)
- Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (Confrontation Clause and admission of records)
- Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53 (2009) (Confrontation considerations for documentary evidence)
- United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2004) (verbal acts doctrine for signatures and similar writings)
- United States v. Bowles, 751 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2014) (false endorsements as verbal acts, not hearsay)
- Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600 (2012) (limits where a specific records statute governs admissibility of hearsay)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
