Commonwealth v. Packer
168 A.3d 161
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Defendant Danielle Packer purchased and inhaled ("huffed") Dust-Off (DFE) immediately before and while driving; she had a known history of blacking out after huffing.
- After inhaling multiple short bursts of DFE, Packer drove on a public highway, lost consciousness while driving, and caused a head-on collision that killed Matthew Snyder.
- Airbag module data showed no throttle or braking in the five seconds before impact; blood drawn ~3 hours later detected DFE (0.28 µg/mL); toxicologist testified peak levels occur within minutes and effects are short-lived but strongly impairing.
- At trial the jury convicted Packer of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, homicide-by-vehicle/DUI offences, and related counts; she was sentenced to 10–20 years.
- Packer challenged sufficiency of the evidence for malice (required for third-degree murder and aggravated assault). The Superior Court affirmed; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to clarify malice vs. ordinary recklessness in DUI contexts involving immediate intoxicants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Packer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved malice for third‑degree murder and aggravated assault | Packer knowingly huffed a rapid, short‑acting intoxicant she knew would likely make her unconscious and nonetheless drove, showing conscious disregard for extreme risk | Driving while intoxicated ordinarily shows only ordinary recklessness; most DUI deaths fit statutory DUI homicide/assault crimes, not malice‑based murder/assault | Court held evidence supported malice: knowledge of immediate incapacitation + history of blackouts + huffing immediately before/while driving showed conscious disregard for an unjustified, extremely high risk |
| Whether decision to drive under influence can alone establish malice | N/A (overlaps with above) | Packer argued precedent limits malice findings in DUI cases absent additional culpable facts | Court reaffirmed that driving under influence alone typically yields ordinary recklessness, but distinguished this case due to the immediacy and predictability of unconsciousness after DFE inhalation |
| Proper mens rea standard for aggravated assault arising from DUI | N/A | Packer argued aggravated assault requires more than ordinary recklessness and was not met | Court reiterated aggravated assault requires malice—recklessness so extreme that death/injury is essentially certain—and found that standard met here |
| Whether prosecutions should use homicide-by-vehicle statutes instead of murder where intoxication causes death | Packer: legislative homicide-by-vehicle statutes are the appropriate fit for most DUI deaths | Commonwealth: severe factual variants can meet common‑law malice and justify murder/assault charges | Court: agrees most DUI deaths should be prosecuted under the statutory DUI homicide/assault scheme, but recognized a narrow class of cases (like this one) may meet common‑law malice and support murder/assault convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180 (Pa. 1946) (shooting/Russian‑roulette example: extreme recklessness showing malice)
- Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478 (Pa. 1995) (driving under influence alone generally insufficient for aggravated assault/malice)
- Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 527 (Pa. 1998) (similar limitation on finding malice where intoxicated driving lacks conscious disregard evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Young, 494 Pa. 224 (Pa. 1981) (malice as conscious disregard for unjustified, extremely high risk)
- Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (Pa. 1868) (classical definition of malice in Pennsylvania law)
- Commonwealth v. Santos, 583 Pa. 96 (Pa. 2005) (malice defined as conscious disregard for an unjustified, extremely high risk)
- Commonwealth v. Levin, 816 A.2d 1151 (Pa. Super. 2003) (driving after substances that previously caused blackouts can support malice)