Commonwealth v. Packer
146 A.3d 1281
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Aug. 6, 2012 Danielle Packer and her fiancé purchased and "huffed" 1,1-difluoroethane (DFE) aerosol duster multiple times, then drove; Packer crossed into oncoming traffic and struck Matthew Snyder's car, killing him.
- Packer exhibited "zombielike" behavior before impact; she admitted prior blackouts from huffing and asked her fiancé "Do you trust me?" before driving.
- Blood drawn ~3 hours after the crash showed .28 mcg/mL DFE; a toxicologist explained DFE has ~23-minute half-life so pre-crash levels would have been several times higher and can cause loss of consciousness.
- A jury convicted Packer of third-degree murder, aggravated assault (including with a deadly weapon), and related offenses; she received an aggregate 10–20 year sentence.
- On appeal Packer challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence (malice) for murder and aggravated assault, (2) jury instructions on "knowingly" (whether §302(b)(2)(ii) should apply), (3) exclusion of a reasonable-doubt illustration, and (4) an alleged Brady violation concerning an expert consult.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency / malice for third-degree murder and aggravated assault | Commonwealth: evidence (multiple huffs, knowledge of blackout risk, driving immediately after, "zombielike" state, no evasive action) shows conscious disregard amounting to malice | Packer: conduct was reckless at worst, not malicious; comparable to ordinary DUI fatalities | Affirmed: evidence permitted finding of malice (conscious disregard of extremely high risk of death/unconsciousness) |
| Jury instruction — definition of "knowingly" (whether §302(b)(2)(ii) applies to both counts) | Packer: court should have read full §302(b)(2) (including result-based "practically certain") for both murder and aggravated assault | Commonwealth: murder charge here is nature/circumstance-based awareness, so only §302(b)(2)(i) applies; result-focused clause applies to deadly-weapon aggravated assault only | Affirmed: court correctly explained that "knowingly" for third-degree murder was awareness of the risk (§302(b)(2)(i)) and that §302(b)(2)(ii) applies to result-based deadly-weapon charge |
| Exclusion of defense's reasonable-doubt illustration (ice-skater/pond) | Packer: exclusion barred a permissible closing analogy to explain reasonable doubt | Commonwealth: illustration could play on jurors' irrational fears; requested limiting instruction | Harmless error: court should not have excluded the illustration, but exclusion produced no prejudice, so no relief granted |
| Brady claim — nondisclosure of exculpatory expert comments | Packer: Commonwealth failed to disclose that a consulted pathologist indicated DFE was not connected to the accident | Commonwealth: the pathologist (Dr. Kamerow) declined to consult due to insufficient clinical history and would not have provided exculpatory impeachment | Denied: record shows Dr. Kamerow would not have offered exculpatory testimony; no Brady violation proven |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892 (Pa. Super. 2014) (standard of review for judgment of acquittal/sufficiency)
- Commonwealth v. Quel, 27 A.3d 1033 (Pa. Super. 2011) (sufficiency review principles; circumstantial evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1998) (impaired driving causing death may be reckless but not necessarily malice)
- Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 1999) (motor vehicle crashes seldom produce malice; definition of malice by reckless disregard)
- Commonwealth v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438 (Pa. Super. 1990) (classic statement of malice as wickedness, hardness of heart, reckless disregard)
- Commonwealth v. Scales, 648 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. 1994) (malice based on conscious disregard of extremely high risk)
- Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 1995) (aggravated assault requires conscious disregard for almost certain death/injury)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111 (Pa. 2011) (Brady framework and impeachment evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2015) (Brady standards reiterated)
- Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001) (prejudice standard for Brady: reasonable probability of different result)
- Commonwealth v. Strong, 761 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 2000) (impeachment evidence is material)