Commonwealth v. Ormond O., a juvenile
AC 16-P-840
| Mass. App. Ct. | Sep 18, 2017Background
- On April 4, 2015, an undercover Quincy detective observed a blue Infiniti driven through a residential area; he followed it because of suspected counter-surveillance and prior drug-area experience.
- The car was stopped in Braintree; occupants were driver Kevin Cardoza (driver), the juvenile (front passenger), and Louis Andrade (rear passenger).
- Detective Keenan saw Andrade reach toward the floor; after securing him, officers found a small bag under Andrade’s seat with seven individually packaged bags of cocaine and, on the back floor where Andrade had reached, a larger bag with twenty‑three individually packaged bags (≈44 grams).
- Police also seized three knives (one from each occupant), seven cell phones, and about $2,000 in cash divided among the three; the juvenile had $294, one phone, and a knife.
- The juvenile was tried in Juvenile Court, found delinquent for possession of cocaine (not guilty of trafficking), and sentenced to six months probation. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge/possession.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Ormond) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to prove juvenile's possession (constructive or joint venture) | Circumstantial facts (driving pattern suggesting counter‑surveillance, drugs in plain view within reach, multiple phones, cash, knives) support inference juvenile knowingly participated/share intent | Proximity alone insufficient; no evidence juvenile saw or handled drugs, no interaction with Andrade, phones/knives/cash do not link juvenile to the stash | Affirmed: Viewed in light most favorable to Commonwealth, a rational jury could infer knowing participation and shared intent (joint venture/constructive possession) |
| Plain view / knowledge element | Drugs on back floor “in plain view” and within juvenile’s reach; officer training supports inferences | No direct evidence juvenile looked, turned, or exercised control; items small/hidden under seat initially; presence alone is insufficient | Court: inference of plain view and knowledge reasonable for jury under circumstantial evidence standard |
| Reliance on “plus factors” (phones, cash, knives, area) | These factors (multiple phones, cash in differing folds, knives, neighborhood drug activity) corroborate intent/participation | These factors are speculative, not tied to juvenile (only one phone, most cash with driver, no description/location of knives) | Court: permitted jury to consider those factors; they contributed to rational inference of joint activity |
| Standard of review (Jackson v. Virginia) application | Evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to prosecution; judge properly denied required finding of not guilty | Appellate review must ensure inferences are reasonable, not speculative; here inferences are conjectural | Court: applied Jackson standard and concluded evidence sufficient; dissent disagreed, calling inference speculative |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (2009) (elements for joint venture: knowing participation and shared intent)
- Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (adopting Jackson sufficiency standard in Massachusetts)
- Commonwealth v. Albano, 373 Mass. 132 (1977) (presence in vehicle alone insufficient; need other incriminating evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Crapps, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 442 (2013) (proximity plus collateral conduct—cash, phones, behavior—may support inference of intent to control contraband)