218 A.3d 863
Pa.2019Background
- Jeffrey Olson pleaded guilty to third-offense DUI and received an enhanced mandatory-minimum sentence (18 months to 5 years) based on his refusal to submit to BAC testing; judgment became final January 20, 2016.
- Birchfield v. North Dakota (decided June 23, 2016) held that states may not criminally penalize refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test (distinguishing blood tests from breath tests under the Fourth Amendment).
- Olson filed a timely PCRA petition (Aug. 17, 2016) arguing his enhanced sentence was illegal under Birchfield; the PCRA court dismissed and the Superior Court affirmed.
- The Superior Court held Birchfield announced a procedural rule and therefore did not apply retroactively on collateral review under the Teague framework.
- This Court (joining prior Pennsylvania decisions and addressing questions presented) affirmed: Birchfield is not a substantive rule for Teague purposes and does not apply retroactively on collateral review.
- The Court clarified that Birchfield invalidates enhanced mandatory minimums based on refusal to warrantless blood tests (per Commonwealth v. Monarch), but because Birchfield is procedural, final sentences rendered before Birchfield cannot be reopened on collateral review via that rule.
Issues
| Issue | Olson's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Birchfield applies retroactively on collateral review | Birchfield announced a categorical, substantive rule (criminalizing refusal to submit to blood draws is beyond state power) and thus applies retroactively | Birchfield set a procedural requirement (warrant or exigency) and is not substantive, so it is not retroactive under Teague | Birchfield is procedural, not substantive; it does not apply retroactively on collateral review |
| Whether Birchfield renders enhanced penalties for blood-test refusal illegal | Birchfield invalidates statutes imposing enhanced punishment for refusal and thus those sentences are illegal | The decision conditions punishment on Fourth Amendment compliance (warrant or exigency) rather than completely prohibiting punishment | Birchfield renders enhanced mandatory-minimums unconstitutional when based on refusal to a warrantless blood test (Monarch) but that rule’s retroactive application is barred by Teague |
| Whether Birchfield created a categorical prohibition against punishing refusal to submit to blood tests | The rule is categorical and places the conduct outside state power to punish | The rule is conditional: punishment remains permissible when test is valid (warrant or exigent circumstances); conduct unchanged | Not categorical; permissibility depends on Fourth Amendment validity (warrant or exigency) |
| Whether analogy to Miller/Montgomery (class-based substantive rule) controls | Birchfield is like Miller (announcing a substantive rule), so Montgomery requires retroactivity | Miller/Montgomery were class-based substantive rules; Birchfield is unlike them because it imposes procedural limits tied to Fourth Amendment compliance | Montgomery/Miller inapposite; Birchfield lacks class-based categorical protection and is procedural |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (Supreme Court: warrantless blood tests may not be criminally enforced; breath tests differ as less intrusive)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (new substantive rules apply retroactively; contrasted with procedural rules)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishing substantive rules from procedural rules for retroactivity)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (recognizing blood tests as Fourth Amendment searches)
- Commonwealth v. Monarch, 200 A.3d 51 (Pa. 2019) (held enhanced mandatory minimums unconstitutional when based on refusal to a warrantless blood test)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (held facts increasing mandatory minimums are elements—analogy to procedural limitations)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juvenile life-without-parole rule later held substantive in Montgomery)
- Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016) (Pennsylvania application of Teague and retroactivity principles)