Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 108 A.3d 900

Eileen O’Neil worked at Gosnell’s Women’s Medical Society Clinic, held herself out as a physician though unlicensed; charged mainly for practicing without a license and billing patients (corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations, theft by deception, perjury, false swearing).
Kermit Gosnell faced extensive, highly inflammatory capital charges (multiple newborn murders, related abortion-act violations); his trial was joined with O’Neil’s and dominated the multi-week proceedings.
Numerous clinic employees (many who pled guilty) testified about Gosnell’s conduct (late-term abortions, live births, killing of infants); most testimony focused on Gosnell and the murder-related conduct, while O’Neil’s involvement would have occupied only a few trial days.
O’Neil moved pre-trial to sever her case from Gosnell’s capital trial; the motion was denied and the joint trial proceeded; she was convicted on two counts each of conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations and theft by deception and sentenced to 6–23 months plus probation.
On appeal, O’Neil argued severance was required because the bulk of the evidence against Gosnell was highly prejudicial and not admissible against her; the Superior Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion and remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (O’Neil)	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by denying severance of O’Neil’s case from Gosnell’s capital trial	Joint trial was proper because defendants were charged with related crimes (conspiracy/corrupt organizations) and jury instructions could prevent prejudice	Evidence against Gosnell was overwhelmingly inflammatory, unrelated to O’Neil’s charges, and not capable of being compartmentalized by the jury; severance required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 582/583	Reversed — severance should have been granted; evidence against Gosnell was so prejudicial that instructions could not cure it
Whether prosecutor’s closing argument (saying O’Neil’s nonaction made her as guilty as the doctor) required mistrial	Not separately reached (Commonwealth relied on overall case)	Argued prosecutorial misconduct meriting mistrial	Not reached — court resolved case on severance ground
Whether exclusion of testimony about another uncharged provider (Dr. Arthur) was erroneous	Not reached	Argued it showed selective prosecution or similar conduct not charged	Not reached
Whether admission of patient record testimony without proper custodianship was erroneous	Not reached	Argued admission violated evidentiary rules	Not reached

Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251 (Pa. Super. 2010) (severance may be required where evidence admitted against co-defendants would be inadmissible and not separable)
Commonwealth v. Schmidheiser, 169 A. 572 (Pa. Super. 1933) (joinder improper where evidence against one co-defendant had no bearing on another and could unfairly prejudice jury)
Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 392 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super. 1978) (setting multi-factor test for severance: complexity/number of defendants, inadmissible evidence risk, antagonistic defenses)
Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 285 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1971) (severance required where distinct incidents produced highly accentuated evidence that likely confused jurors)
Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954) (joint trial permissible when offenses arise from same acts and evidence largely overlaps)
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 546 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1988) (cautionary instructions can suffice in some joint-trial contexts but not where evidence is uniquely prejudicial)
Hartman, 31 Pa. Super. 364 (Pa. Super. 1906) (conspiracy defendants generally should be tried together, but severance may be warranted in special circumstances)
Portner, 92 Pa. Super. 48 (Pa. Super. 1927) (joint trial appropriate where offenses and evidence are of the same character and arise from same circumstances)