Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.
2017 Pa. LEXIS 1682
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Muniz was convicted in 2007 of indecent assault of a child under 13 but absconded before sentencing; when resentenced in 2014 he was subject to SORNA’s Tier III lifetime registration (Megan’s Law would have required 10 years).
- SORNA (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.41) replaced prior Megan’s Law regimes, established tiered lifetime/longer registration, frequent in-person verification, broad internet publication, and criminal penalties for noncompliance.
- Muniz challenged retroactive application of SORNA under the federal and Pennsylvania ex post facto clauses; the Superior Court affirmed; this Court granted review.
- The Court applied the Smith v. Doe intent/effects test and the Mendoza‑Martinez factors to decide whether SORNA’s registration scheme is punitive despite statutory statements it is nonpunitive.
- The lead opinion (Dougherty) concluded SORNA’s registration provisions are punitive in effect and that retroactive application violates both the federal and Pennsylvania ex post facto clauses; Justices Baer and Donohue joined; Justices Todd and Wecht joined most parts; Wecht concurred (separate); Saylor dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Muniz’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SORNA’s registration provisions are punishment (intent/effects test) | SORNA’s text/structure and effects (lifetime reporting, frequent in-person verification, internet publication, over‑inclusiveness) show punitive purpose/effect despite statutory nonpunitive label | Legislature declared SORNA civil; objective is public safety and federal compliance; Smith and Mendoza‑Martinez support nonpunitive characterization | Held: statute is punitive in effect; legislative label insufficient to avoid finding punishment |
| Whether retroactive application of SORNA violates the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause | Retroactive conversion of prior registration terms to longer/lifetime terms increases punishment in violation of ex post facto | Smith controls: registration laws are regulatory; SORNA is rationally related to public safety and not excessive | Held: retroactive application violates the federal ex post facto clause |
| Whether Pennsylvania’s Ex Post Facto Clause offers greater protection than federal clause | Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights (including reputation), history, and precedent justify a broader protection; SORNA’s reputational harms and over‑inclusiveness reinforce that view | State and federal clauses are coterminous; federal framework adequate; policy supports public safety regulation | Held: Pennsylvania clause provides greater protection here; SORNA also violates the state ex post facto clause |
| Scope/remedy: relief from SORNA requirement imposed at resentencing | Muniz sought application of prior (shorter) registration period in lieu of SORNA’s lifetime scheme | Commonwealth defended resentencing order applying SORNA | Held: Superior Court reversed; SORNA registration requirement vacated as applied to Muniz |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (statutory intent/effects framework for determining whether sex‑offender registration is punitive)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (Mendoza‑Martinez factors guide punitive‑effect analysis)
- Williams v. Commonwealth (Williams II), 574 Pa. 487 (Pa. 2003) (Pennsylvania application of intent/effects test to Megan’s Law II)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (discussion of ex post facto requirements: retrospection and disadvantage)
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (historical articulation of categories of ex post facto laws)
- Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (clarifying weight of Mendoza‑Martinez factors and deference to legislative intent)
- United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (civil regulatory objectives and their relevance to punitive‑effect analysis)