78 N.E.3d 51
Mass.2017Background
- On July 8–9, 2007, Christian Muller and an accomplice entered an apartment, shot three occupants; two died and one survived and identified "Christian" as the shooter. Muller later admitted shooting the victims.
- Muller was charged and convicted by a jury of two counts of first‑degree murder (premeditation and felony‑murder), armed assault with intent to murder, armed home invasion, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
- Muller's primary defense was lack of criminal responsibility based on schizoaffective disorder, neurodevelopmental deficits, and heavy voluntary use of cocaine and other drugs; he admitted drug use and reported hallucinations but also gave statements reflecting awareness and post‑event planning.
- Defense presented three experts: one diagnosed schizoaffective disorder but gave no criminal‑responsibility opinion, another found psychotic symptoms but could not determine etiology (illness v. substance), and a neuropsychologist opined Muller lacked capacity to conform his conduct. Commonwealth experts found malingering/exaggeration and concluded Muller was criminally responsible.
- At trial the judge instructed the jury on the interaction of mental disease and voluntary intoxication but omitted the Berry instruction that, when mental disease alone causes lack of capacity, voluntary intoxication does not bar the defense. The jury returned guilty verdicts; Muller appealed and sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Muller) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction re: criminal responsibility and voluntary intoxication | Instruction correctly allowed consideration of (1) independent active mental disease and (2) activation of latent disease by drugs; Commonwealth argued evidence showed Muller knew drugs worsened his illness | Instruction erred under Berry and DiPadova by (a) failing to state that voluntary intoxication does not preclude the defense when mental disease alone causes lack of capacity and (b) using confusing "latent" language | Court: Omitted the Berry formulation (error), but no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice because no evidence mental disease alone caused incapacity; DiPadova concern unfounded because evidence showed Muller knew drugs exacerbated symptoms. |
| Other jury instructions re: burden language | Burden of proof was adequately given elsewhere in charge | Several offense instructions omitted explicit statement that failure to prove elements requires acquittal, or used formulation that could be read as mandatory | Court: Viewed charge as a whole and held no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; overall instructions sufficiently conveyed the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard. |
| Instruction on inference of sanity | Court avoided placing heavy weight on inference; allowed jurors to consider it | Instruction (traditional "majority of men are sane" inference) should not have been given per Lawson | Court: Giving the inference was error under Lawson, but judge mitigated risk by telling jurors they need not adopt it and by repeatedly stressing Commonwealth's burden; no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice. |
| Prosecutor's closing argument | Prosecutor may argue that defense is weak and point to evidence of malingering | Prosecutor demeaned lack of criminal responsibility, misstated law, vouched for witnesses, and impermissibly labeled defendant a "faker" | Court: Remarks (calling defense a "crutch," "not a raving lunatic," referencing malingering) were improper rhetoric but did not create a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice given the evidence and instructions; no reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602 (Mass. 2010) (holds that if mental disease alone causes lack of substantial capacity, voluntary intoxication does not preclude insanity defense)
- Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424 (Mass. 2011) (clarifies availability of defense when drug use activates a latent mental disease and the defendant lacked knowledge that drugs would trigger it)
- Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (Mass. 1967) (formulates the McHoul test: not criminally responsible if, due to mental disease or defect, defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct)
- Commonwealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314 (Mass. 1970) (mental disease is sine qua non of insanity defense; voluntary intoxication alone does not support it)
- Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806 (Mass. 2016) (rejects instruction encouraging jurors to rely on an inference that defendant was sane because most people are sane)