Commonwealth v. Moore
109 N.E.3d 484
| Mass. | 2018Background
- On March 22, 2010 a masked intruder executed Margaret Przewozniak during an armed home invasion in Springfield; two masked men fled in a light-gray Dodge minivan. Victim kept cash in a small keyed strongbox. Murder weapon not recovered.
- Police broadcast witness descriptions and later located a minivan registered to the defendant's mother; officers stopped the van, arrested the defendant and his brother, and conducted showup identifications that yielded multiple identifications of the van and, for some witnesses, of the defendant.
- Forensic testing found the victim's DNA on the defendant's T‑shirt and inside the minivan; gunshot residue on the defendant's hands tested negative. The defendant made a spontaneous statement to police implicating his brother as uninvolved.
- Defendant was convicted of first‑degree murder (premeditation, extreme atrocity/cruelty, and felony‑murder predicated on armed home invasion/robbery) and related offenses; convictions and denial of a new‑trial motion were appealed under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
- On appeal the defendant raised multiple claims: exclusion of portions of a police radio broadcast (Bowden and third‑party culprit theories), failure to preserve the correct booking videotape, improper suggestive showup identification, admission of prior testimony of an unavailable witness (Brown), ineffective assistance/newly discovered evidence, and requested § 33E relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of police radio broadcast (third‑party culprit vs Bowden) | Commonwealth argued hearsay/layered hearsay barred portions describing perpetrators | Moore argued descriptions were admissible to show investigative inadequacy (Bowden) and/or third‑party culprit evidence | Third‑party culprit theory: exclusion proper (layered hearsay). Bowden theory: descriptions were admissible but their exclusion was harmless given other evidence; no reversal |
| Failure to preserve/disclose booking videotape | Commonwealth had no bad faith and remedied by permitting cross‑examination about absence of visible blood | Moore said missing videotape could have shown no blood at booking and supported transfer theory | Court assumed defendant met initial burden but found no bad faith and that cross‑examination and other remedies cured prejudice; no new trial |
| One‑on‑one showup identifications (due process) | Commonwealth: prompt public‑safety justification; no special unfairness | Moore: showups were inherently suggestive and risked misidentification | Showups occurred within hours, there was strong public‑safety justification, and procedures lacked special elements of unfairness; identification admissible |
| Admission of unavailable witness Brown's prior testimony; impeachment with grand jury testimony | Commonwealth: prior testimony admissible and satisfied Confrontation Clause because defendant had prior opportunity to cross‑examine at suppression hearing | Moore: prior testimony violated hearsay/Confrontation Clause and suppression counsel ineffectively failed to impeach Brown with grand jury inconsistencies | Admission did not violate Confrontation Clause (prior hearing allowed adequate cross‑examination); counsel should have impeached with grand‑jury inconsistency but omission was not prejudicial given abundant independent identification and forensic evidence |
| Ineffective assistance / newly discovered evidence / § 33E relief | Commonwealth: counsel's strategic choices were reasonable; no showing that new technology would have produced different outcome | Moore: counsel erred (e.g., declined nolle on drug charge, failed to call blood‑spatter expert); new video technology would show no blood at booking | Tactical choices were not manifestly unreasonable; failure to present expert unsupported by affidavit; sister's hearsay about technology insufficient. No § 33E relief; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. 782 (2009) (distinguishes third‑party culprit and Bowden defenses and discusses admissibility rules)
- Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1979) (permitting challenge to adequacy of police investigation as Bowden defense)
- Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60 (2005) (standard for admitting third‑party culprit evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201 (2014) (layered hearsay and reliability concerns for third‑party culprit evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Caillot, 449 Mass. 712 (2007) (discussing layered hearsay and admissibility limits)
- Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155 (2006) (Bowden evidence relevance where suspect did not match broadcast descriptions)
- Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304 (2017) (one‑on‑one showups generally disfavored but permitted with public‑safety justification)
- Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204 (2014) (when showup identifications are impermissibly suggestive)
- Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434 (2014) (good reason for prompt showup where firearm not recovered)
- Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357 (1995) (public safety justification for prompt identification)
- Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275 (2017) (Confrontation Clause analysis for admission of prior recorded testimony)
- Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53 (2009) (adequate prior opportunity to cross‑examine for confrontation purposes)
- Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822 (2004) (prior cross‑examination addressing substantially same interests satisfies confrontation clause)
- Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837 (2013) (§ 33E review scope and standards)
- Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743 (2017) (applying § 33E standard to ineffective assistance claims)
