Commonwealth v. Mills
2017 Pa. LEXIS 1380
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Commonwealth filed criminal complaint (drive-by shooting; attempted murder, aggravated assault) on June 6, 2011; scheduling conference in Sept. 2011; trial initially set for April 2, 2012.
- On March 20, 2012, Commonwealth requested continuance because discovery incomplete, prosecutor unavailable, and possible DNA testing; trial rescheduled to Sept. 10, 2012 (about 9.5 months after filing at time of conference).
- Appellant filed a Rule 600 motion to dismiss for violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (trial to commence within 365 days); parties disputed whether 174 days should be excluded from the 365-day computation.
- Common Pleas enforced Rule 600 and granted dismissal; Superior Court reversed, adopting Commonwealth’s reading that many routine pretrial periods are excludable.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review, addressing whether ordinary case progression (trial preparation between scheduling events) constitutes "delay" chargeable to the Commonwealth under Rule 600.
- Court reversed Superior Court and remanded to reinstate dismissal, holding that ordinary trial preparation is not per se excludable as Commonwealth-caused delay; Commonwealth bore burden to prove due diligence before judicial-calendar delay could be applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether periods of ordinary trial preparation are "delay" under Rule 600 | Appellant: ordinary, routine progress (scheduling to status) is not "delay"; only time outside ordinary progression counts as delay | Commonwealth: Rule 600(C) computational instructions allow exclusion so prosecution can cause up to 365 days without due diligence; routine pretrial time excludable | Ordinary trial preparation is not automatically "delay" chargeable to the Commonwealth; Commonwealth must prove due diligence before delay is excused |
| Proper order of inquiry under Rule 600(C)(1) | Appellant: (implicit) treat routine progression as non-delay; burden on Commonwealth to show culpable delay | Commonwealth: interpret rule to permit broad exclusions under (C)(1) | Court requires courts first assess Commonwealth’s due diligence; only if Commonwealth acted with due diligence may court consider judicial/calendar delay |
| Whether Superior Court correctly interpreted Rule 600 revisions | Appellant: revisions did not eliminate Rule 600’s 365-day requirement | Commonwealth: revisions alter primary directive and permit broader exclusions | Superior Court erred; its interpretation undermined Rule 600 and was reversed |
| Remedy when Commonwealth fails to meet prompt-trial rule | Appellant: dismissal warranted if 365 days exceeded due to Commonwealth's lack of due diligence | Commonwealth: sought to avoid dismissal via broad exclusions | Dismissal reinstated because contested days could not be excluded absent Commonwealth showing of due diligence |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Morgan, 484 Pa. 117, 398 A.2d 972 (explains that ordinary occurrences between complaint and trial are not "delay")
- Commonwealth v. Bradford, 616 Pa. 122, 46 A.3d 693 (recognizes concept of judicial delay and analyzes attribution after assessing due diligence)
- Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764 (discusses appellate review standard for prompt-trial rulings and due diligence obligations)
- Commonwealth v. Browne, 526 Pa. 83, 584 A.2d 902 (places burden on Commonwealth to prove due diligence)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 477 Pa. 424, 383 A.2d 1280 (prosecutors must act reasonably to try cases on time)
- Commonwealth v. Hawk, 528 Pa. 329, 597 A.2d 1141 (discusses scope of due diligence obligation under Rule 600)