Commonwealth v. Mayotte
475 Mass. 254
| Mass. | 2016Background
- Linda Mayotte was convicted of multiple sex offenses against her adopted son D.M., plus other crimes; she was acquitted on some counts and her husband Joseph was separately convicted for abusing their adopted daughter V.M.
- D.M. alleged repeated sexual abuse by Mayotte beginning in 2005; he first complained to authorities on June 4, 2009, after a domestic dispute and threats from Mayotte regarding stolen jewelry.
- Mayotte’s defense at trial was that D.M. raped and coerced her and that she only later reported his conduct; she sought to admit "first complaint" testimony from a friend (Edward Kassor) to support that theory.
- The trial judge excluded Mayotte’s proffered first complaint evidence and also excluded testimony of D.M.’s grandfather recounting D.M.’s statement "I can beat any system," which Mayotte sought to use to impeach or show her state of mind.
- Mayotte was convicted on a reckless endangerment charge alleging exposure of V.M. to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; the indictment omitted the statute’s alternative theory (sexual abuse). The SJC vacated that conviction and affirmed the others.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the first complaint doctrine applies to a defendant who claims to be the sexual-assault victim | First complaint doctrine should be limited to the complainant; allowing defendant would cause confusion and be hearsay | First complaint is a neutral evidentiary rule and should apply whenever credibility of a sexual-assault allegation is at issue | Court: First complaint doctrine is neutral and may be used by a defendant alleging assault by the complainant, but exclusion here was harmless |
| Whether exclusion of Mayotte’s proffered first complaint testimony was reversible error | Commonwealth: testimony inadmissible as hearsay and doctrine limited to complainant | Mayotte: needed testimony to rebut prosecution’s theme that she never complained; alternatively, prior consistent statement after fabrication incentive | Court: Exclusion as a matter of law was error, but proffer was vague and would not have rebutted Commonwealth’s proof; no prejudice; alternative prior-consistent argument rejected |
| Admissibility of D.M.’s statement to grandfather (“I can beat any system”) as evidence of defendant’s state of mind or impeachment | Commonwealth: statement irrelevant/hearsay, not tied to defendant’s state of mind | Mayotte: statement showed D.M.’s mindset, impeached his testimony and explained defendant’s fear/powerlessness | Court: Statement not shown to bear on defendant’s state of mind, admissible impeachment via prior inconsistent statement should have been allowed but its limited exclusion was not prejudicial |
| Sufficiency/notice of reckless endangerment indictment (serious bodily injury) | Commonwealth: jury instruction on exposure to risk of sexual abuse was proper given surrounding counts | Mayotte: indictment alleged substantial risk of serious bodily injury only and omitted sexual-abuse theory | Court: Indictment failed to charge the sexual-abuse theory; judge’s instruction expanded indictment impermissibly; conviction for reckless endangerment vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 (Mass. 2005) (recast fresh-complaint rule as first-complaint doctrine and limited testimony to first person told)
- Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214 (Mass. 2009) (first-complaint doctrine not intended to withhold fair picture of Commonwealth’s case)
- Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302 (Mass. 2013) (rejecting one-sided evidentiary rules; fairness in applying rules to both sides)
- Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441 (Mass. 2008) (expressions of upset or ambiguous remarks are not statements of sexual assault)
- Commonwealth v. Mahar, 430 Mass. 643 (Mass. 2000) (permitting impeachment by prior inconsistent statement)
- Commonwealth v. Tennison, 440 Mass. 553 (Mass. 2003) (prior consistent statements admissible to rebut recent-fabrication claim)
- Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348 (Mass. 1994) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507 (Mass. 1914) (indictment must give sufficient notice to prepare a defense)
- Commonwealth v. Garrett, 473 Mass. 257 (Mass. 2015) (conviction cannot rest on a theory not charged in indictment)
- Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547 (Mass. 1995) (due process bars felony conviction without grand jury indictment)
- Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 88 (Mass. 1993) (judge may explicitly reject reliance on improper sentencing arguments)
- Commonwealth v. Celeste, 358 Mass. 307 (Mass. 1970) (sentencing judges have broad discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659 (Mass. 1998) (appellate relief for sentencing only for clear legal error)
- Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449 (Mass. 2008) (suggestion of impropriety at sentencing may warrant scrutiny)