Commonwealth v. March
154 A.3d 803
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 14, 2015, police responded to a single‑vehicle crash; the driver, Kim March, was unresponsive and transported to the hospital.
- Officers observed in the vehicle items suggesting heroin use (blue wax bags, residue in a cut prescription bottle, and a hypodermic needle) and witness statements that the driver was "out of it" and pale.
- Sergeant Brown went to the hospital, had probable cause to suspect DUI by a controlled substance, and requested a blood draw at 7:59 p.m.; March was not under arrest and was unconscious (the DL26 form was not read).
- Lab testing revealed Schedule I controlled substances in March’s blood; the Commonwealth charged March with DUI and related offenses.
- The trial court suppressed the blood results, relying on McNeely and Commonwealth v. Myers, reasoning police could have obtained a warrant and Myers controlled; the Commonwealth appealed.
- The Superior Court reversed, holding Sections 1547 and 3755 (implied consent and ER reporting statutes) permit warrantless blood testing/results when an unconscious accident victim requires medical treatment and police have probable cause to suspect DUI.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | March's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless blood draw/results were admissible | Statutory implied consent and §3755 allow police to request blood and obtain results without a warrant when an accident victim is unconscious and probable cause exists | McNeely and Myers require a warrant or suppression where blood is drawn without a warrant from an unconscious person | Reversed suppression: statutory scheme (§1547/§3755) allows hospital blood draw/results without a warrant for an unconscious accident victim when police have probable cause |
| Whether McNeely’s exigency analysis controls | Not controlling here because McNeely addressed exigent‑circumstances analysis, not the statutory implied‑consent/ER‑reporting scheme triggered by accidents | McNeely bars warrantless blood draws absent case‑specific exigency; Myers applied that rule to an unconscious arrestee | McNeely is distinguishable; statutory scheme, not exigent‑circumstances analysis, governs these facts |
| Whether Myers requires suppression | Commonwealth: Myers is distinguishable (defendant there was under arrest and became unconscious due to hospital meds; here March was an unconscious accident victim and never under arrest) | March: Myers controls because facts are similar and warrantless draw violated Fourth Amendment | Myers is distinguishable; suppression in Myers does not control this accident/§3755 context |
| Whether March had statutory right to refuse blood | Commonwealth: March was not under arrest and therefore lacked the §1547(b) statutory right to refuse; implied consent/§3755 permit testing | March: unconscious person should have the ability to refuse; without a warrant, the test violated Fourth Amendment | March had no statutory right to refuse because he was not under arrest; statutes authorize blood draw and release of results to police with probable cause in accident cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (dissipation of alcohol is not a per se exigency; exigency inquiry is case‑by‑case)
- Commonwealth v. Myers, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015) (warrantless blood draw of an unconscious arrestee suppressed under totality of circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1994) (interpreting §1547: “reasonable grounds” = probable cause; unconscious accident victims not afforded statutory right to refuse)
- Commonwealth v. Barton, 690 A.2d 293 (Pa. Super. 1997) (together §§1547 and 3755 permit police to obtain hospital blood test results when probable cause exists in an accident)
- Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1992) (explaining implied consent: testing allowed absent an affirmative showing of refusal; arrested drivers have statutory right to refuse)
- Commonwealth v. Miller, 996 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. 2010) (statutory scheme allows preservation of blood samples and testing to investigate DUI)
- Commonwealth v. Guzman, 44 A.3d 688 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard of review for Commonwealth appeals from suppression orders)